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ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE-THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES-
NAMED BENEFICIARIES UNDER A WILL MAY BRING A CAUSE OF
ACTION IN ASSUMPSIT AGAINST THE DRAFTING ATTORNEY. Guy
v. Liederbach, - Pa. -, 459 A.2d 744 (1983).
In Guy v. Liederbach,' a divided 2 Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held3 that while privity" is essential to maintain an action in negli-
gence for professional malpractice, named beneficiaries under a will
who lose their intended legacies because of the improper administra-
tion of the testamentary instrument may bring a cause of action in
assumpsit against the drafting attorney. In reaching its conclusion,
the court espoused new guidelines for resolving third-party claims"
and thereby carved out an exception to the general rule that an at-
torney-client relationship must be shown to exist before liability will
be imposed on the negligent attorney.6 Significantly, the decision in
Guy appears to remove a major stumbling block in Pennsylvania,
which heretofore had insulated incompetent attorneys from claims
brought by persons outside the attorney-client relationship.
On February 24, 1957, Edward J. Kent retained Harry J.
Liederbach, a Pennsylvania attorney, to draft his last will and testa-
ment. Liederbach prepared the will that day, naming Frances E.
Guy as beneficiary of the residuary estate.' The will was subse-
quently signed by Kent and, allegedly at Liederbach's direction, was
witnessed by Guy.
When Kent died the will was submitted to probate, and on July
11, 1973, Guy qualified as executrix in the office of the Surrogate in
Camden County, New Jersey.8 A probate court in Camden County,
1. - Pa .... 459 A.2d 744 (1983).
2. Justice Hutchinson wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Nix, Larsen and Mc-
Dermott joined in the reasoning and disposition of the contract theory of recovery. Justice
McDermott, joined by Justice Larson, filed a dissenting opinion disagreeing with the reasoning
and disposition of the tort theory. Chief Justice Roberts dissented on both issues. Although
Justice Nix joined in the majority opinion, he filed a concurrence providing further comment.
3. The court did not decide the merits of the case, but merely determined whether plain-
tiff could bring a cause of action against the defendant and what form that action should take.
4. Privity is defined as "[t]hat connection or relationship which exists between two or
more contracting parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979).
5. The court adopted the principles set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 302 (1979). See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
7. The will directed that Guy receive the residue of the estate after payment of a $4,500
bequest, and nominated her to be the executrix of the will. - Pa. -, 459 A.2d at 747.
8. Kent owned property in New Jersey and apparently was a resident there at the time
relying on a New Jersey statute,9 then ruled that Guy was barred
from taking under the will because she was an attesting witness. Guy
subsequently filed a complaint in both trespass and assumpsit, claim-
ing Liederbach was liable for her failed legacy.
The Bucks County Court of Common Pleas dismissed"0 Guy's
action on the ground that no attorney-client relationship was alleged
to exist between the parties." On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court reversed,' 2 holding that, despite the absence of privity, Guy
could maintain either a tort action based on the principles articu-
lated in Lucas v. Hamm's or an action in assumpsit in accordance
with the court's novel interpretation of the third party beneficiary
principles employed in Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Rapis-
tan.'4 Because the superior court's holding constituted a change in
the law of Pennsylvania in areas of both attorney malpractice" and
third party beneficiaries,' 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme court granted
review to consider the propriety of that decision. On review, the su-
preme court affirmed the superior court's recognition of the assump-
of his death. Id. at - n.3, 459 A.2d at 747 n.3.
9. The applicable statutes at the time of the execution of the will provided, in pertinent
part, the following:
§ 3A:3-6 Effect of divisee or legatee attesting will
No person who has attested a will shall be incompetent to testify concerning the
execution thereof by reason of his being a beneficiary thereunder; but whether or
not he testifies, as to him and those claiming under him, any beneficial device,
legacy, estate, interest, gift, or appointment of or affecting real or personal prop-
erty . . . shall be void.
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-6 (West 1953).
§ 3A:3-7 Attesting witness not to receive gift directly or indirectly
No attesting witness to whom a beneficial estate, interest, gift, or appointment is
given or made, which is declared void pursuant to 3A:3-6 of this title, shall de-
mand or take possession of, or receive any profit or benefit of or from such es-
tate, interest, gift or appointment so given or made to him by the will, or de-
mand, receive or accept from any person any such legacy or bequest . . . in any
manner or under any color or pretense whatsoever.
Id. § 3A:3-7. Note that in 1978 the New Jersey legislature repealed the above provisions and
enacted N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:2A-7(b) (West 1980), which does not invalidate any will be-
cause the will was signed by an interested witness.
10. Guy v. Liederbach, 33 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 300 (1979).
11. The court relied on the requirement of privity set out in Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa.
532, 37 A. 98 (1897), and two federal cases, Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
and Connelly v. Wolf, Block, Schair & Solis-Cohen, 433 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1978), which
have found Pennsylvania to be a "strict privity" state requiring an attorney-client relationship
to exist before there can be a malpractice action. 300 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 300, 302 (1979).
12. Guy v. Liederbach, 279 Pa. Super. 543, 421 A.2d 333 (1980).
13. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962) (setting forth a balancing test for evaluating an attorney's liability to third persons).
See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
14. 472 Pa. 36, 371 A.2d 178 (1976). In Rapistan the court hypothetically employed the
principles set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7,
1973) for determining whether parties to a contract intended a right to flow directly to a third
party. Id. at 44-46, 371 A.2d at 182.
15. The superior court refused to adhere to the rule in Pennsylvania that privity is neces-
sary for maintaining a professional malpractice suit. 279 Pa. at 543, 421 A.2d at 335-36.
16. The superior court sought to adopt the principles set forth in RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). See infra note 14.
sit action, but reversed the order allowing an action in tort.' 7
Traditionally lawyers were well insulated from professional lia-
bility to persons other than their immediate clients. 8 Because of the
historical barrier of privity,' 9 a lawyer's duty ran only to his client,
and in the absence of an attorney-client relationship, no third party
had standing to maintain a cause of action." Assurgent develop-
ments,21 however, indicate that the doctrine of privity may be re-
garded as a mere anachronism in the field of tort law rather than a
prevailing defense.22 Affected by the ascendancy of foreseeability
considerations,23 the trend 24 is toward a rejection of the once mono-
lithic defense, allowing recovery to persons other than clients on both
contract and tort theories. 5
17. - Pa. at , 459 A.2d at 753.
18. See infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion on the history and evolution of contractual privity concepts in the
area of attorney malpractice, see D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCE-
DURE § 6:2, at 93-102 (1980); M. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 71-81, at
143-62 (2d ed. 1981); Averill, Attorneys Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Malprac-
tice, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 379, 384-96 (1967); Keeton, Professional Malpractice, 17
WASHBURN L.J. 445, 448-51 (1979); Note, Attorney's Negligence, 5 LINCOLN L. REV. 154,
157-70 (1970).
20. The leading case is Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879), in which a debtor's
lawyer owed no duty to the creditor who relied upon an erroneous certificate of title, citing
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) (the leading case requiring privity of
contract to create a duty of care to persons injured by negligent activity). See infra notes 26-
33 and accompanying text.
21. In discussing the latest developments concerning professional liability for negligence,
one legal commentator noted:
The most potentially explosive development in the field of legal malpractice is
the expansion of the scope of liability of attorneys to those individuals other than
the immediate client. Not only must practicing attorneys be aware of liability
hazards which grow out of the attorney-client relationship, but they must now
recognize those circumstances in which the adversary client or even a remote
third party can seek recovery for an attorney's negligence.
D. MEISELMAN, supra note 19, at 93 (footnote omitted).
22. Professor Corbin has said that privity "is no longer of much interest because court
action is not much influenced by it." 4. A. CORBIN, CORaIN ON CONTRACTS § 778, at 29
(1951).
23. The barrier of privity has been eliminated when it was clearly foreseeable that the
plaintiff would be injured by the negligence of the defendant. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel]; Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vend-
ees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134 (1937). See also infra notes 40-61 and accompanying text.
24. Contemporary authority has recently observed that "[tihe modern trend in the
United States is to recognize the existence of a duty beyond the confines of those privy to the
contract of the attorney-client relationship." M. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 19, at 156.
25. Dean Prosser finds that third party beneficiaries' rights are imbedded in tort law,
rather than contract principles:
The absence of 'privity' between the parties makes it difficult to found any duty
to the plaintiff upon the contract itself. But by entering into a contract with A,
the defendant may place himself in such a relation toward B that the law will
impose upon him an obligation, sounding in tort and not in contract, to act in
such a way that B will not be injured. The incidental fact of the existence of a
contract with A does not negative the responsibility of the actor which he enters
upon a cause of affirmative conduct which may be expected to affect the interest
of another person.
The United States Supreme Court became the first appellate
court in America to consider attorneys' liability to third parties when
it decided the landmark26 case of Savings Bank v. Ward.17 Drawing
upon English precedent as its principal authority, the majority
stated:
Beyond all doubt, the general rule is that the obligation of the
attorney is to his client and not to a third party, and unless there
is something in the circumstances of this case to take it out of
that general rule, it seems clear that the proposition of the de-
fendant [attorney] must be sustained. 8
Absent a showing of fraud, collusion, or an act imminently danger-
ous to human life, privity was deemed essential to establishing liabil-
ity in actions brought by non-clients against attorneys.2 9 The Court
embraced the rationale articulated in the heavily criticized 0
Winterbottom v. Wright decision, 1 and reiterated the fears of Lord
Abinger that eliminating the privity requirement would lead to "ab-
surd and outrageous consequences, ' 3 2 to which no limit could be
seen. Because the Court assumed these fears, it declaratively held
that without privity the law could impose no duty on the attorney,
and with no duty there could be no liability in tort for the negligent
rendition of professional services.3
Sixteen years later, in Buckley v. Gray,3 4 the California Su-
preme Court raised the shield of privity erected in Savings Bank to
bar an action brought against an attorney who had negligently exe-
cuted a will. In Buckley, the plaintiff tried to circumvent the privity
W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 93 at 622. See also infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
26. Savings Bank is often cited as the leading case requiring privity of contract in negli-
gence actions brought by non-clients against attorneys. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d
583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 62, 250 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1969); Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236, 237, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922); Braer v. Broder, 106 Misc. 2d 929, 929-30, 436
N.Y.S.2d 693, 694 (1981). In each of these cases, however, the court held that lack of privity
would not preclude the plaintiff from recovering for the defendant's negligence. But see
Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 199 (D.C. 1980).
27. 100 U.S. 195 (1880).
28. Id. at 200.
29. Id. at 203-04. Note that in this decision, the court opened the door to the first possi-
ble exception to the privity rule: If there is fraud, collusion, or other intentional acts, privity is
not required.
30. Dean Prosser pointed out that certain dicta in Winterbottom was misinterpreted to
mean that no action in tort could be maintained for negligent performance of a contract, and
from this error in interpretation, "there developed a general rule which prevailed into the
twentieth century that there was no liability of a contracting party to one with whom he was
not in 'privity'." W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 93, at 622 (footnotes omitted).
31. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
32. Id. at 405 (Abinger, L.J.).
33. 100 U.S. at 200. See also D. MEISELMAN, supra note 17, at 94.
34. 110 Cal. 330, 42 P. 900 (1895), overruled on other grounds, Biakanja v. Irving, 49
Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
doctrine by claiming he was a third party beneficiary"5 under the
contract to prepare the will.36 The court reasoned, however, that to
accept such an argument would be to "confound the terms of the
will with those of the contract. '3 7 Therefore, in recognizing that the
immediate contractual benefit accrued directly in favor the testatrix,
the court held that the plaintiff was merely an incidental beneficiary
with no right to relief. 8
Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, attorneys were virtu-
ally immune from liability to those outside the attorney-client rela-
tionship. The insular concept of privity set forth in Savings Bank
precluded recovery in tort, while Buckley irrefutably denied relief to
disappointed legatees who sought damages in assumpsit.39
Non-attorney cases, however, began to forge new law. In order
to redress the grievances of negligently injured third parties, the
courts began to retreat from the strict privity requirement. In the
seminal case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,40 the court re-
jected the privity requirement 1 and expressed the fundamental phi-
losophy that the responsibility owed to third persons injured by neg-
ligent activity rested not upon contract, but rather upon the
foreseeability of harm in the absence of due care."2 Subsequently,
35. For an explanation of third party beneficiary theory, see generally 4 A CORBIN,
CONTRACTS §§ 772-781 (1951); 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§
347-403 (3d ed. W. Jaeger ed. 1959 & Supp. 1981); Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 880 (1982).
36. 110 Cal. at 344, 42 P. at 901.
37. Id. at 347, 42 P. at 902.
38. The court held the plaintiff was merely an incidental beneficiary because there was
no showing of a "contract expressly made for his benefit." Id.
39. Regarding third party beneficiary actions against attorneys, the Buckley court
stated: "Although the ultimate consequential injury to plaintiff would appear to have been
great, it was, so far as defendant is concerned, damnum absque injuria, against which the
courts are powerless to relieve." Id.
40. 417 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). At issue in this products liability case was
whether the defendant car manufacturer owed a duty to the purchaser of the car, who sus-
tained injuries as a result of a defective wheel, even though the purchaser obtained the vehicle
from an independent dealer and not the defendant. id. at 384-85, 111 N.E. at 1051.
41. For a discussion on the expansion of liability resulting from the elimination of the
privity requirement in products liability cases, see W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 96; Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 23; Jeanblanc, supra note 23.
42. The court stated:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing
else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put
its source in the law.
2127 N.Y. at 386, 111 N.E. at 1053. Although MacPherson was a products liability case
directed at protecting consumers from defective products, the policy underlying the elimination
of the privity rule projected the expansion of duty in numerous areas of the law, including
attorney malpractice. See, e.g., supra note 19 (scope of professional liability in attorney mal-
practice); Ajax Hardware Mfg. v. Industrial Plants Corp., 569 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1977) (ap-
praiser); Howard v. Pfeifer, 433 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968) (insurance agent); Tarasoff v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (psychiatrist);
Westerhold v. Carrol, 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967) (architect); Rosenthal v. Blum, 529 S.W.2d
102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (physician); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah
the MacPherson rationale was extended to pecuniary harm in
Glanzer v. Shepard.'s This case signaled a warning to attorneys that
contractual privity was not an impenetrable barrier against liability
to third persons: "One who follows a common calling may come
under a duty to another whom he serves although a third may give
the order to make payment. ' 44 Nonetheless, the development of the
broad Glanzer rule, which seemed to impose liability solely on the
basis of foreseeable reliance by a third party, was effectively re-
tarded by the New York Court of Appeals in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Nevin & Co."5 Justice Cardozo distinguished this case from
Glanzer on the grounds of foreseeability, 46 and held that the privity
rule was still a viable defense, absent knowledge on the part of the
defendant of a specific reliant third person who may be injured by
professional negligence.' 7 A contrary holding would, concluded Car-
dozo, entail "liablity in an indeterminate amount for an indetermi-
nate time to an indeterminate class.'
48
The MacPherson, Glanzer, Ultramares trilogy announced the
emergence of a rule which defined liability for professional negli-
gence where privity was lacking. Undaunted by conventional doc-
trine, the California Supreme Court49 solidified the rule in a six-part
formula set out in the landmark decision of Lucas v. Hamm.50
1974) (accountant); Cuffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976)
(building inspector).
43. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (holding public weighers liable to a buyer of
beans even though the certificate of weight had been issued by the seller).
44. This case opened the door to recovery by persons who relied on professional repre-
sentations made to a client based on both a tort theory and a contract theory of liability. See
Keeton, supra note 19, at 458.
45. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). The court held that a third party creditor who
had loaned money to an insolvent company in reliance upon financial statements prepared and
circulated by an accounting firm was not in privity with accountants and therefore, could not
recover for their negligence, in the absence of a special relationship, because damages were
only generally foreseeable. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446. An example given by the court as
constituting such a special relationship was a situation involving a "clearly designated" third
party beneficiary. Id. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445.
46. In Glanzer, the service rendered was primarily for the information of a specific per-
son who the weigher knew would rely on his action. While in Ultramares, the certified
financials were only incidentally for the benefit of some bank or creditor who the accountants
did not specifically know would rely on their action and incur injury. The distinction was
whether the particular plaintiff was actually foreseen or merely among an indeterminate class
who would foreseeably be harmed by the negligence. Id. at 181-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
47. id.
48. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
49. It has been said that "[w]ithin the last half century, the California Supreme Court
had reached a position of eminence that few other state courts could match, with a solid repu-
tation for innovative and widely imitated approaches to difficult problems." Crawford, Chief
Justice Wright and the Third Party Beneficiary Problem, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 769
(1977).
50. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962). Lucas adopted the factor analysis developed in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320
P.2d 16 (1958), which was the first in a series of California cases utilizing a balancing test to
determine whether liability should be imposed when a third person is injured by professional
negligence. In Biakanja, the court held that a legatee could recover against a notary who, in
Reasoning that unless a negligently excluded legatee was enti-
tled to recover against the scrivener of the testamentary document,
the intent of the testator would necessarily be defeated, the court
abandoned the privity requirement, thereby expressly overruling its
earlier precedent. 1 Rather than focusing on contractual privity con-
cepts, the court balanced various factors to determine whether a
third party should be entitled to relief. These factors included the
extent to which the attorney's services were intended to affect the
plaintiff;52 the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff was injured; the proximity of the connec-
tion between the attorney's conduct and the resulting injury; the pol-
icy of preventing harm in the future; and the extent to which third-
party suits would impose an undue burden on the legal profession."
If the balance of these factors warranted imposition of liability de-
spite lack of contractual privity, the named beneficiary could main-
tain an action in tort against the attorney as a matter of public pol-
icy.54 Furthermore, reasoning that a beneficiary of a will is directly
affected by the relationship between the attorney and the testator,
the court held a cause of action could also be brought on the basis of
a third party beneficiary theory. 5
An examination of the cases involving professional malpractice
reveals that actions brought by third parties against attorneys for
negligence in the administation of testamentary instruments have el-
ements of both contract and tort. In Heyer v. Flaig," however, the
California Supreme Court laid to rest any doubt as to which theory
of recovery a negligently injured third party could pursue in that
state. The court observed that when a lawyer undertakes to prepare
a will for his client, "he realistically and, in fact, assumes a relation-
ship not only with the client but also with the client's benefi-
violation of a statue prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law, negligently prepared dece-
dent's will. 49 Cal. 2d at 649, 320 P.2d at 18.
51. 56 Cal. 2d at 588-89, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824. The court held that a
beneficiary could recover against the attorney, thus overruling the strict privity test enunciated
in Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895). See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying
text.
52. This first factor appears to be a spinoff of the third party beneficiary theory, in
which one material element to finding liability is whether the parties to the contract intended
to "benefit" the third party. See 4 A. CoRBIN, supra note 22, §§ 772-781. Nevertheless, the
term "affect", as opposed to "benefit", probably provides Lucas with a more expansive reach.
See M. MALLEN & V. LEvIT, supra note 19, at 161 (intent to "affect" encompasses those
persons who foreseeably may be injured by the attorney's negligence).
53. 56 Cal. 2d at 588, 364 P.2d at 687-88, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24. The extent to which
third party suits would impose an "undue burden on the legal profession" was a factor in
Lucas which replaced a "moral blame" standard utilized in Biakanja, indicating that the lat-
ter consideration was employed solely because of the statute violation problem in Biakanja.
See supra note 50.
54. 56 Cal. 2d at 589, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
55. Id.
56. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
ciaries."5 In such a case, a lawyer owes a duty to the beneficiaries
that is separate and distinct from the duty owed his client. 58 If negli-
gence is then alleged to be the cause of harm to a disappointed lega-
tee, pursuit of a contractual remedy "is conceptually superfluous
since the crux of the action must lie in tort. 59 Significantly, the
Heyer court rejected the contract theory of recovery advocated in
Lucas,6" and held that the plaintiff's remedy existed solely in tort.61
It would appear that California, as the forerunner 62 in the at-
tack upon the bastion of privity, has effectively eliminated the doctri-
nal barriers of the past by employing various equitable principles
which have tended to permeate both tort and contract law. In Guy v.
Liederbach, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for the first time, was
presented with the opportunity to apply the equitable principles ar-
ticulated by the California courts63 in resolving third-party claims.
The Guy court ignored this opportunity. In refusing to adopt Califor-
nia's factor analysis for evaluating an attorney's liability to third
parties, the Guy court retained the requirement that a party must
show an attorney-client relationship as a necessary prerequisite for
maintaining a negligence action," and thus, remained among the
majority of jurisdictions which still support the privity rule.65 Never-
theless, in recognizing a cognizable cause of action in assumpsit, the
Guy decision is consistent with the modern trend66 in gradually ex-
panding attorneys' malpractice liability.
57. Id. at 228, 449 P.2d at 164-65, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29 (1969).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 227, 449 P.2d at 164, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 228. See also supra note 25.
60. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
61. 70 Cal. 2d at 900-01, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
62. Several jurisdictions have followed California in extending the scope of attorneys'
professional liability to non-clients. See, e.g., Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558
P.2d 988 (1976) (attorney liable to incompetent for guardian's conversioh of funds); Stowe v.
Smith, -. Conn. - , 441 A.2d 81 (1981) (attorney liable to beneficiaries of negligently
drawn will); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (attorney liable
to beneficiaries for negligence in the administration of a will); Silver v. George, 1 Hawaii 331,
618 P.2d 1157 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980) (attorney liable to named payees of promissory note);
Succession of Killingsworth, 270 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 1972), a f'd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973) (attorney liable to beneficiaries for negligence in
drafting will); Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 196 A.2d 150 (1972) (attorney liable to
primary creditor for negligently advising of priority status); Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super.
581, 362 A.2d 581 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (attorney representing buyers of securities
held liable to purchasers for negligence in consummating transaction).
63. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
64. - Pa. at -, 459 A.2d at 750.
65. See M. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 19, at 152-53; Annot., 45 A.L.R. 3d 1181,
1187-90. See also McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968) (applying South Da-
kota Law); Lackey v. Vickery, 57 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Mo. 1944) (applying Missouri law);
Favata v. Rosenberg, 106 II1. App. 3d 572, 436 N.E.2d 49 (1982); Rose v. Davis, 288 Ky. 674,
157 S.W.2d 287 (1941), overruled on other grounds, Penrod v. Penrod. 489 S.W.2d 524 (Ky.
1972); Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981); Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d
685, 344 N.Y.S. 2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1973), affid,. 43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1973);
Graham v. Turcoffe, 628 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
66. See supra note 24.
The Guy majority prefaced its inquiry into the issue of attorney-
third party liability with the recognition that Lawall v. Groman,
67
albeit in dicta,68 permits a third party to institute a negligence action
against an attorney if the attorney knew that the third party was
relying on his professional expertise.69 Finding Pennsylvania to be a
strict privity state,7 0 the court held that the claimant did not state a
cause of action under these dicta.7 1 The Guy court concluded, "At
the very least, Lawall would require a specific undertaking on the
attorney's part to perform a specific service for a third party, coupled
with the reliance of the third party and the attorney's knowledge of
that reliance.
'72
Cognizant of the fact that nonsuiting the disappointed benefi-
ciary would remove the only mechanism available to effectuate the
client's intent,'7 the court focused its analysis on the merits of adopt-
ing the Lucas court's factor analysis74 and its corresponding eradica-
tion of the privity rule as a defense to a negligence claim.7 However,
the court rejected the California test, referring to the "ad hoc deter-
minations and inconsistent results"17 1 suffered by the California
courts in their attempt to refine the broad Lucas rule.7 Of particular
concern to the majority, was the impracticabilty of implementing the
test's complex negligence standards.7  At the core of its reasoning,
67. 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897). In Lawall, a mortgagee sued the mortgagor's attorney
for his failure to properly search records to ensure that her mortgage would be the first lien on
the property. The court did not really address itself to the question of privity of contract or the
third party beneficiary concept. Instead, it found that an attorney-client relationship existed
between the plaintiff and defendant even though the plaintiff did not pay defendant's fee, and
that defendant owed a duty to plaintiff for the breach of which he would be liable. Id. at 540,
37 A. at 99.
68. The court was concerned with the following language: "The payment of a fee is the
most usual and weighty item of evidence to establish the relationship of client and attorney,
but it is by no means indispensable." Id. at 637-38, 37 A. at 98.
69. - Pa. at - , 459 A.2d at 749.
70. The court cited Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1963) and Connelly v.
Wolf, Black, Schorr & Salis-Cohen, 463 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See supra note II.
71. - Pa. at - , 459 A.2d at 749.
72. Id.
73. As an ancillary issue, the court determined whether the estate could sue the drafting
attorney. Reasoning that "in the case of a failed legacy, the estate is not harmed in any way",
the court concluded that the executrix had no standing to file suit, and therefore, the benefi-
ciary was the only one available to bring a cause of action. Id.
74. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
75. - Pa. at - , 459 A.2d at 749.
76. Id. An example of an apparent inconsistent result is evident by comparing Goodman
v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) with Roberts v. Ball,
Hunt, Hort, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976). In Good-
man, an attorney was held not to be liable to purchasers of stock who had relied on the attor-
ney's erroneous advice given to his client about the sale of stock, because the purchasers were
not in the class of people that the advice was "intended to affect." 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d
at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381. In Roberts, on the other hand, an attorney was held liable to a
lender who the attorney knew would rely on erroneous advice given to his client about the
status of a partnership. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 105, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
77. - Pa. at - , 459 A.2d at 749.
78. Id. at -, 459 A.2d at 749-50. Although the majority did not elaborate on the
however, was the recognition that the policy concerns underlying the
retention of privity and the dangers of adopting negligence concepts
of duty analyzed in terms of foreseeability, as set forth in Ul-
tramares, demanded a more restrictive cause of action than that es-
poused by the California courts.7 9 Consequently, the court was not
persuaded to eliminate the privity rule on the basis of the rationale
propounded in Lucas.80
The majority also refused to accept the contention that abolition
of vertical and horizontal privity in products liability cases81 dictated
a similar abrogation in suits involving professional malpractice.
8 2
The court observed that while mass-produced products have an equal
impact on all ultimate users, "professional services must be crafted
to meet the needs of individual clients.""5 Because of the personal
nature of their services, public policy requires that attorneys, acting
strictly in their professional capacities as agents, should be free to
advise their clients without fear of being held liable to third parties
if the advice they have given later proves erroneous. 84 Thus, the pol-
icy shift away from privity, reflected almost seventy years ago in
MacPherson,85 did not persuade the court to eliminate the strictures
of the compulsory privity doctrine in malpractice actions predicated
on a theory of negligence. Rather, the court held that such suits are
barred unless an attorney-client relationship or a specific undertak-
ing by the attorney, as in Lawall, is shown to exist.86
While the majority determined that the elimination of the priv-
difficulty encountered in implementing the test, one commentator has stated that "the individ-
ual factors are difficult to interpret and are not tailored to many attorney-third party situa-
tions." Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126, 142 (1982).
79. - Pa. at -, 459 A.2d at 750-52. The court merely alluded to the "policy
concerns" and "dangers" expressed by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares. Nevertheless, the mes-
sage is clear. Cardozo feared that an extension of liability for negligent misrepresentations
causing only pecuniary harm would subject the professions to such great and indeterminate
liability that they would be forced to increase their rates or refrain from offering their services,
and in either case, the result would be harmful to the economic interests of the community.
Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179-84, 174 N.E. 441, 444-46 (1931). See
also Seavey, Chandler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.-Negligent Misrepresentations by Account-
ants, 67 L.Q. REV. 466, 478 (1951).
Note, however, that on the facts of this case, even Justice Cardozo would have recognized
a properly restricted cause of action in negligence since he did not exclude clearly designated
beneficiaries from bringing actions for negligent misrepresentations. See supra note 45. In-
deed, this case is factually similar to Glanzer, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text,
because the will, like the certificate in Glanzer, "was the end and aim of the transaction."
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 236, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (1922).
80. - Pa. at - , 459 A.2d at 750.
81. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
82. - Pa. at - , 459 A.2d at 750.
83. Id.
84. See D. & C. Textile Corp. v. Rudin, 41 Misc. 2d 916, 919, 246 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
85. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
86. - Pa. at - , 459 A.2d at 750.
ity requirement would raise the spectre of indeterminate liability, 7 it
nevertheless held that a properly restricted cause of action in as-
sumpsit is available to negligently excluded beneficiaries who would
otherwise have no recourse for failed legacies that result from attor-
ney malpractice. 88 In reaching its conclusion, the court espoused new
guidelines in accordance with the principles for resolving third-party
claims set forth in section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts,89 and thereby expressly overruled9" earlier precedent to the
extent that it stated the exclusive test for third-party beneficiaries.
Under this new approach, a named beneficiary is an intended91 bene-
ficiary and thus entitled to institute suit if two requirements are met.
First, the recognition of the beneficiary's right must be "appropriate
to effectuate the intentions of the parties. 92 Second, the "circum-
stances must indicate that the promisee intends to give the benefi-
ciary the benefit of the promised performance."9 8
In applying this analytical framework to the facts in Guy, the
court searched for indicia of intention within the ambit of the trans-
action and found that the contract between the testator and the at-
torney for the drafting of the will unmistakably manifested the in-
tent of the testator to benefit the person named therein. 4 Under
these circumstance, the recognition of the right of the beneficiary to
bring suit would be "appropriate to effectuate the intentions of the
87. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
88. - Pa. at -, 459 A.2d at 753.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979) states:
§ 302 Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of the right to performance in
the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to
pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary
the benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.
90. - Pa. at - , 459 A.2d at 751. The court overruled Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins.
Co., 364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 828 (1950), to the extent that it required both parties (promisor and
promisee) to manifest an intent to benefit the third party beneficiary. In adopting the Restate-
ment approach, the Guy court abandoned this shared intentions theory and primarily focused
on the intent of the promisee. - Pa. -, 459 A.2d at 751. This approach has met with
approval by at least one commentator. See Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 880 PASSiM (1982). BUT SEE Jones, LEGAL
PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES: ON OPENING COURTHOUSE DOORS, 46 U. CIN.
L. REV. 313, 320 (1977) (supporting Spires shared intentions test).
91. The court indicated that "intended" beneficiaries would have standing to sue,
whereas "incidental" beneficiaries would not. - Pa. -, 459 A.2d at 751. An incidental
beneficiary is a beneficiary that is not an intended beneficiary. See supra note 89.
92. The court interpreted the first part of the test as setting forth a standing require-
ment that leaves discretion with the trial court to determine whether recognition of third party
status would be "appropriate." - Pa. at -, 459 A.2d at 751.
93. Id. at -, 459 A.2d at 752.
94. Id.
parties." 8 Based on this analysis, the court held that named legatees
under a will are proper third party intended beneficiaries for pur-
poses of maintaining an action in assumpsit. 96
To reinforce this conclusion, the majority made it clear that ac-
tions brought by third party beneficiaries should not be analyzed in
tort terms, focusing on traditional negligence elements said to arise
from a breach of a contractual duty.97 Rather, because "the class of
persons to whom the defendant may be liable is restricted by princi-
ples of contract law, not negligence principles relating to foreseeabil-
ity or scope of the risk," cases brought by third party beneficiaries
sound in assumpsit and involve considerations more restrictive than
trespass.98
Justice Nix joined the majority opinion and in a concurrence
expressed his acceptance of the "legitimacy of the policy arguments
. . . for restricting recovery under a theory of malpractice." 99 Not
all of the justices, however, were as agreeable as Justice Nix.
Chief Justice Roberts offered a dissenting opinion in which he
attacked the majority's reasoning and disposition of the contract the-
ory of recovery. Justice Roberts argued that in light of the amount
of relief demanded by the beneficiary, it was apparent that what he
was actually seeking to enforce was not a promise made between the
attorney and decedent, but rather a duty owed to him directly under
the law of torts.100 While the majority failed to recognize such a
duty in a cause of action in trespass, Justice Roberts found "no logi-
cal basis for [the majority's] imposition of a similar duty as a pur-
ported application of third-party beneficiary law."'01
Justice McDermott, joined by Justice Larsen, also offered a dis-
senting opinion. Justice McDermott discredited the majority's ra-
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The court expressly rejected the Heyer court's view that it is "conceptually superflu-
ous" for a third party beneficiary to resort to a contract theory of recovery. Id. See supra notes
56-61 and accompanying text. To adopt such a view, determined the court, would be to con-
found the "doctrines relating to standard of care with those relating to scope of the risk."
Pa. at -, 459 A. 2d at 752.
98. Id. at -, 459 A.2d at 752. The court indicated that the recognition of the as-
sumpsit action was consistent with the amount of damages demanded by the beneficiary, the
measure of which was in terms of expectancy loss. However, the court left open the question
whether damages in other cases should be governed by tort principles of proximate cause or by
contract principles. Id. If the measure of damages is based on contract principles then injured
parties are precluded from recovering "consequential" damages, which include damages for
pain and suffering, mental anguish, and injury to reputation. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, § 138 (1935).
99. - Pa. at -, 459 A.2d at 751.
100. Justice Roberts indicated that if the decedent could have sought relief for the attor-
ney's breach of contract, then his measure of damages would have been merely the value of a
new will. Because the beneficiary sought far greater relief than that which would have been
available to the decedent, it necessarily followed, in Justice Roberts view, that the beneficiary
sought to receive damages under the law of torts.
101. Id.
tionale supporting the privity rule, referring to the widespread aboli-
tion of the rule and its essential irrelevancy in establishing the scope
of professional liability in the area of attorney malpractice.10 He
noted that recent New York decisions have held that the policy con-
cerns expressed in Ultramares are inapplicable where professional
negligence is directed to a clearly designated third party.103 Thus,
Justice McDermott fostered the belief that considerations of privity
are entirely extraneous when applied to a negligence action brought
by a specific identifiable third person, and rather than attempting to
twist what are essentially negligence claims into actions for breach
of contract,104 the foreseeability of harm should be of paramount im-
portance and the determinative factor in resolving the liability issue.
He then proposed a simple solution: "A duty breached is a tort, and
the remedy exists in an action in trespass."105
Justice McDermott's simple solution should not be ignored. By
refusing to eliminate the privity rule as a defense to a negligence
action, the Guy majority appears to have paved an unwarranted in-
road upon the principle that "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed." 10 6 While the courts which have abol-
ished the privity requirement harbor the same fears with regard to
indeterminate liability embodied in the decisions of both Savings
Bank and Ultramares,10 7 they have nevertheless created a frame-
work broad enough to compensate deserving plaintiffs without rais-
ing the spectre of indeterminate liability: Liability is circumscribed
by traditional tort principles of foreseeability, causation and dam-
ages, with the nature of the underlying attorney-client contract de-
fining the duty owed.108 Thus, in light of the evolution of the law
102. Id. at - , 459 A.2d at 753. Justice McDermott cited several legal scholars to
support his position. See, e.g., Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning-Perilous
Time Ahead for the Practitioner, 67 IOWA L. REV. 629 (1982); Note, Attorney's Negligence
and Third Parties, supra note 78; Note, Attorney Negligence in Title Examinations and Will
Drafting: Elimination of the Privity Requirement as a Bar to Recovery by Foreseeable Third
Parties, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 955 (1982).
103. - Pa. at -, 459 A.2d at 753. Justice McDermott cited White v. Guarantee,
43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977). In White the court held an ac-
countant liable to a partner even though the partnership had retained the defendant, because it
was foreseeable that one of the members of the partnership would rely on the accountant's
negligent representations about the status of the partnership. The court distinguished this case
from Ultramares on the ground that in this case, the plaintiff was among a limited group of
people who would foresecably rely on the accountant's representations; whereas in Ultramares,
the plaintiff was a member of an indeterminate class of people who might rely on the represen-
tations made by the accountant.
104. Rather than compartmentalize the action in terms of contract or tort, Justice Mc-
Dermott proposed the following rule: "[W]here through the negligence of a lawyer scrivener of
a will, a known designated beneficiary loses a legacy, the lawyer must answer in damages."
Pa. at - , 459 A.2d at 753.
105. Id.
106. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 9, 100 (1928).
107. See supra note 62.
108. Id.
regarding third party recovery, 10 9 it would appear that in Guy, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted a comparatively restrictive
approach, providing relief only to those who are intended to be bene-
fited by a contractual performance.110 As a result, many third party
plaintiffs will be denied compensation, and attorney misconduct will
not be deterred.
Nevertheless, Guy v. Liederbach represents an exception to the
general rule that an attorney-client relationship must exist in order
to impose liability upon the incompetent attorney. In extending the
third party beneficiary concept to the area of attorney malpractice,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has taken the first step toward a
gradual expansion of attorneys' malpractice liability beyond the con-
fines of those privy to the contract of the attorney-client relationship.
109. See supra notes 18-62 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 67-98 and accompanying text.
[Casenote by Albert G. Dugan, Jr.].
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-FOURTH AMEND-
MENT-JUSTIFICATION OF A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE UNDER THE
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535
(1983).
In Texas v. Brown,' the Supreme Court of the United States
held 2 that application of the plain view doctrine to a situation involv-
ing a warrantless seizure based on probable cause is not violative of
the fourth amendment.' The Court unanimously agreed that the
three requirements4 necessary to apply the plain view doctrine were
satisfied: first, the police officer lawfully stopped the automobile;5
second, he inadvertently discovered a tied party balloon in the
driver's possession;6 third, the officer was immediately aware of the
incriminating potential of the balloon 7 because he knew narcotics
were often packaged in this manner;8 and, therefore, possessing the
requisite probable cause,' the policeman lawfully seized the balloon
without a warrant. The Court, however, was unable to promulgate
an exact definition of the doctrine or to enumerate conclusively the
occasions when plain view may be used to justify a warrantless
seizure.10
On the evening of June 18, 1979, Police Officer Harold Maples
1. 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
2. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White and O'Connor. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Powell
wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens wrote a concur-
ring opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
3. The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
8. The Texas Legislature has defined "drug paraphernalia" used in connection with a
controlled substance, which result in a violation of the Controlled Substance Act, as "[A]
capsule, balloon, envelope, or other container used or intended for use in packaging small
quantities of a controlled substance." Tex. Stat. Ann., art. 4476-15 § 1.02 (29-:) (Vernon
1982).
9. The Supreme Court identified "probable cause" as a "flexible, common-sense stan-
dard." 103 S. Ct. at 1543.
10. All of the members of the Court agreed that the police officer did not violate the
fourth amendment, but there was a lack of unity among the Justices concerning specific war-
rant clause requirements.
was stationed at a routine, nonrandom license checkpoint in Fort
Worth, Texas. He stopped" an automobile and requested to see the
driver's license. The driver, Clifford James Brown, reached into the
pocket of his trousers and withdrew a dollar bill and a small green
balloon 12 stuck between his fingers. Maples shined a flashlight into
the car and saw the balloon drop to the seat. Brown reached toward
the glove compartment, still searching for his driver's license, while
Maples, somewhat suspicious of the contents of the balloon, shifted
his position to gain a better view of the interior of the car. As Brown
rummaged through the glove compartment, Maples saw a few empty
plastic vials, quantities of a white powdery substance,1 3 and a bag of
party balloons. Brown told the policeman that he did not have his
driver's license in his possession and Maples instructed him to get
out of the car. The police officer then reached into the car and seized
the green balloon.
Maples and a fellow officer, who indicated that he "understood
the situation," advised Brown that he was under arrest. 4 The two
officers conducted a thorough on-the-scene inventory of the automo-
bile, and seized several plastic bags containing a green leafy sub-
stance and a large bottle of milk sugar, in addition to the balloon.
At a pretrial hearing before the district court,'" Brown's motion
to suppress was denied. The police department chemist who analyzed
the contents of the balloon testified that the substance found inside
of the container was heroin. Both Officer Maples and the chemist
testified that narcotics frequently are packaged in ordinary party
11. Routine drivers license checkpoints are acceptable in Texas:
Every person shall have an operator's, commercial operator's, or chauffeur's
license in his possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall
display the same upon demand of a magistrate or any officer of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction or any peace officer. Any person who violates this Section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . Any peace officer may stop and detain any
motor vehicle for the purpose of determining whether such person has a driver's
license as required by this Section.
TEX. STAT. ANN. art 6687b § 13 (Vernon 1977).
12. The balloon was uninflated and tied about one half inch from the tip. 103 S. Ct. at
1538.
13. The powdery substance discovered in the glove compartment was determined not to
be a controlled substance. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
14. It is not clear from the record exactly when Brown was arrested. The Supreme
Court reasoned that whenever it took place, it was justified because of Brown's failure to
produce a driver's license. The Court did not attempt to decide whether the arrest was made
upon his failure to produce the license or at some point following the seizure of the balloon.
103 S. Ct. at 1538 n.2.
The opinion writer for the Court of Criminal Appeals suggested somewhat conflicting
notions concerning the exact time of the arrest. At one point the writer indicated that the
police officer based the arrest on the sight of the balloon, 617 S.W.2d at 199; later in the
opinion the writer indicated that the arrest was made when Brown failed to produce his li-
cense. Id. at 200.
15. The case was heard initially in the 213th Judicial District Court, Tarrant County,
Texas.
balloons.16 Brown was convicted 17 for possession of heroin in viola-
tion of state law.18
On appeal,'9 the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed,20
holding that the warrantless seizure of the balloon could not be justi-
fied under the plain view doctrine, 21 and therefore, the evidence
should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari2" to consider the scope and
applicability of the plain view doctrine and reverseds the judgment
of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The fourth amendment2 4 lays the foundation for analysis of the
scope and applicability of the plain view doctrine. However, the law
concerning fourth amendment principles is complex"" and has caused
16. The officer's knowledge of common practices in narcotics dealings established the
basis for the probable cause required for lawful seizure. 103 S. Ct. at 1540.
17. Brown entered a plea of nolo contendere before the District Court. 617 S.W.2d at
197.
18. The trial court assessed punishment at four years imprisonment pursuant to a nego-
tiated plea bargain. Id.
19. Brown did not take the witness stand or judicially confess to the offense charged
against him at either the hearing on his motion to suppress or at the trial on his plea of nolo
contendere. These acts preserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress. Id. at 198.
A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules
hereinafter prescribed, provided, however, before the defendant who has been
convicted on either his plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere before the court
and the court, upon election of the defendant, assesses punishment and the pun-
ishment does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and
agreed to by the defendant and his attorney may prosecute his appeal, he must
have permission of the trial court, except on those matters which have been
raised by written motion filed prior to trial.
TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 44.02 (Vernon 1977).
This issue involving Brown's standing to appeal was a major portion of the opinion of the
Court of Criminal Appeals. It was the understanding of the Court that the defendant had no
right to appeal for his plea of nolo contendere, but he did have the right to appeal the decision
on the motion to suppress. First, the court found that Brown had "successfully navigated the
procedurally hazardous passageway of Article 44.02," and then the court went on to consider
the search and seizure issue. 617 S.W.2d at 199.
20. 617 S.W.2d at 200.
21. While rejecting the sole argument advanced by the state that the balloon seized was
in plain view incident to a lawful arrest, the court considered earlier Texas cases in which
containers observed in plain view were found to be insufficient bases for the probable cause
required to affect a lawful warrantless seizure. See De Lao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977) (substance inside of a red balloon placed on a window sill was not in plain
view). See also Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (plastic bags not
seizable); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (photographic negatives
not seizable under plain view doctrine). Cf. Simpson v. State, 486 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972) (capsules of heroin seizable). The court did not question the validity of the plain
view doctrine when all of the requirements of the exception were met. 617 S.W.2d at 200.
22. 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
23. 103 S. Ct. at 1544.
24. In considering the fourth amendment, one commentator noted, "Nowhere in the law
have so few words generated so much litigation and confusion." J. HALL, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 1:1 at 2 (1982). [hereinafter cited as J. HALL].
25. There is a great deal of literature written on the topic, however, substantial portions
of the law of search and seizure defy simplification and categorization. See J. HALL, supra
a great deal of controversy. Exceptions to the warrant requirement, 6
standards of probable cause, 27 and expectations of privacy28  have
been prime sources of litigation. It would be kind to say that the
Supreme Court29 has been less than clear about the question of when
the police constitutionally may conduct a search or make a seizure
without a warrant.80
Every search and seizure case contains the broad question of
reasonableness. The Supreme Court must consider the facts of each
case individually to determine whether the intrusion involved is un-
reasonable under the fourth amendment.3 1 Additionally, all discus-
sion of search and seizure standards must begin with the basic pre-
mise that warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable under the
fourth amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well delineated exceptions." s3 2 Supreme Court approval 3 in these
note 24, at vi. The difficulty encountered with search and seizure cases is a consequence of the
fact that they do not present ordinary legal controversies. Because they arise under the Consti-
tution, variations in the facts in these cases are of constitutional significance. This means that,
in each case, the Supreme Court not only must decide what the facts are, but must determine,
in rather minute detail, just what the significance of the facts, or the combination of facts, is in
the case which is before it. E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SU-
PREME COURT 40 (1975). [hereinafter cited as E. GRISWOLD].
26. There are circumstances under which the police are permitted by the Constitution to
make a search or seizure without first obtaining a search warrant. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1 at 3 (1978). See infra notes 47-49.
27. The Supreme Court has never given a comprehensive definition of what constitutes
"probable cause" to support a warrant. The Court has stated that there is no formula for the
determination of reasonableness, each case must be decided upon its own facts and circum-
stances. See generally J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES (1974). See infra
notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
28. The fourth amendment protects the right of privacy. That right is older than
the Bill of Rights, older that the Constitution, older even than Common Law.
The right of privacy is as old as the history of man. Privacy-the right to be let
alone-is a central concept in a free society. Privacy supplies the only setting in
which an individual can live in dignity.
J. CREAMER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 110 (1980). See infra note 45.
29. Traditionally, Supreme Court Justices have been vocal in their dissatisfaction with
the state of the law of search and seizure. See, e.g., "To be sure, the opinions of this Court in
Warrant Clause cases have not always been consistent," 103 S. Ct. at 1544 (Powell, J., con-
curring); "This branch of the law is something less than a seamless web," Cady v. Dombrow-
ski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973); "The course of the law of search and seizure has not - to put
it mildly - run smooth," Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
30. For a complete discussion of Supreme Court opinions involving warrantless searches,
see LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the "Quag-
mire," 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9 (1972). [hereinafter cited as Warrantless Searches].
31. For a discussion concerning the Supreme Court's arduous task when deciding a
fourth amendment search and seizure case, see E. GRISWOLD, supra note 25.
32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Some opinion writers stress that
exceptions are only granted in the most extreme situations, while other writers take a much
more relaxed approach to the warrant exception. Compare Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 499 (1958) (jealously drawn exceptions) with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457
(1981) (exigency may make exemption from warrant requirement imperative).
33. There have been many instances when warrantless searches have been approved by
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (auto search); New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (incident to arrest); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979) (roadblock); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (exigent circumstances); Terry v.
instances has sparked a considerable amount of conflict 3 4 among the
Justices. Concerned with the basic individual rights"5 involved in
fourth amendment controversies, historically,"' the Court has been
and continues s7 to be hesitant in broadening the scope of these ex-
ceptions. The plain view doctrine has frequently been listed among
generally accepted exceptions;38 however, a Supreme Court majority
has never expressly adopted the doctrine as an independent excep-
tion to the warrant-requirement clause. 9
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,"0 however, in a plurality opin-
ion, the plain view doctrine was, for the first time,'41 held to be an
independent' 2 autonomous exception, provided the circumstances of
the seizure warrant its application. In Coolidge, the Supreme Court
was confronted with the issue of the admissibility of certain evidence
seized during a warrantless search.' 3 The Court considered three
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (police
emergency).
34. Disagreement among the Justices is exemplified by the quantity and fervor of con-
curring and dissenting opinions written in conjunction with search and seizure cases. The aver-
age search and seizure case takes little more than twice as many pages for decision as the
average of all other cases decided by the Court. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 25, at 14. See infra
notes 46 and 92.
35. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), the Supreme Court emphasized
that the fourth amendment protects people, not places, and also that people are protected from
searches wherever they have "reasonable expectations of privacy which society is willing to
recognize."
36. In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), the Court discussed the constitutional
guaranty of the right of people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Later, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), Justice Bradley
commented:
It may be that it is the obnoxious things in the mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconsitutional practices get their first footing in that
way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legitimate modes
of procedure. . . It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional.
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
37. In Texas v. Brown, Justice powell stressed the significance of the warrant clause, the
purpose of the fourth amendment, and the carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. 103 S. Ct. at 1544 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. It appears that the doctrine, as a recognized exception, was first suggested in Justice
Stewart's plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See Moylan,
The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Bat-
tie, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Plain View Doctrine], for an in
depth discussion of the plain view doctrine and Justice Stewart's opinion.
39. 103 S. Ct. at 1540.
40. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
41. In Coolidge, "plain view" is clearly articulated as a doctrine in its own right for the
first time. A plain view type of exception had been alluded to in earlier cases in conjunction
with other exceptions. For example, in United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), the phrase
plain view was never used, but the evidence seized by Revenue officers, with the aid of a
searchlight, was not rendered inadmissible. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948) (search incident to arrest exception); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932)
(search of desks and cabinets in full view pursuant to arrest).
42. Whether the Court in Coolidge really accepted plain view as an independent excep-
tion is questionable. The plurality opinion was highly criticized and only three Justices joined
Justice Stewart in his opinion.
43. The admissibility into evidence of vacuum sweepings taken from an automobile
without the benefit of a search warrant was the subject of the controversy.
theories proposed by the state, and attempted to bring the facts of
the case within one or more of the recognized exceptions to the war-
rant requirement. The proposals were examined critically"" in light
of fourth amendment privacy guarantees.4 5 In his plurality opinion,""
Justice Stewart listed "plain view" among "search incident to valid
arrest" 47 and the "automobile exception" 8 as recognized doctrines 9
44. Justices Stewart, White, and Black stressed in their opinions the importance of care-
ful analysis of fourth amendment issues.
45. Justice Stewart cited several significant Supreme Court cases upholding the constitu-
tional rule against unreasonable searches and seizures. 403 U.S. at 453-55. See, e.g., Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (search and seizure of private papers); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (search and seizure standards and the fourth and fifth amend-
ments). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (governmental eavesdropping on
telephone booth); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) (acting with good reason
seizure conducted without warrant); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (seizure in
hotel room); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (surveillance and seizure of
illegal lottery); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (general search
by prohibition officers pursuant to invalid warrant).
46. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan, and Marshall joined. Justice Harlan joined in part and filed a concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Burger filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Black filed a concurring and
dissenting opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined in part. Justice White filed a concurring
and dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice joined in part.
Justice White's dissent was so critical that Justice Stewart felt compelled, in light of Jus-
tice White's remarks, to defend specifically the plurality position in the last section of his
opinion.
47. The search incident to a valid arrest extends the area that may be validly searched
to include the area in the possession or under the control of the arrested person. The Supreme
Court has approved the extension when either the safety of the arresting officer or the destruc-
tion of evidence by the person being arrested is at issue. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950) (valid arrest and search of business.) But see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (valid arrest did not justify search).
Historically, the Supreme Court's handling of the search incident to arrest exception has
been somewhat inconsistent. Compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (nar-
row interpretation) with Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (broad interpretation).
These two decisions indicate contrary interpretations of the exception, notwithstanding the fact
that they were handed down only one year apart.
Justice Frankfurter, in an extensive dissenting opinion in Harris, traced the Court's er-
ratic application of the search incident to arrest exception in a detailed analysis of twenty-six
Supreme Court decisions containing search and seizure issues. 331 U.S. at 175-82 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
See The Plain View Doctrine, supra note 38, at 1050-62, for a thorough discussion of the
search incident to arrest exception and its significance in the development of the plain view
doctrine.
Items referred to as visible and accessible, in plain sight, or in open view are often men-
tioned in search incident to arrest cases. When the scope of the search incident to arrest excep-
tion is broadly interpreted, objects in plain view may be validly seized if they are within the
extended area of diminished expectation of privacy. See Harris, 331 U.S. at 186 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (plain sight); Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61 (plain sight).
48. The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles
may be permissible whenever the police have probable cause to do so. See Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924). See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (car stopped
by police cruiser); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (car removed to police station).
The Court has always based its decision on "reasonableness" upon all the facts and cir-
cumstances of particular cases. The automobile exception has been approved based on the
reduced expectations of privacy a person has in his vehicle, and some of its contents, and on
the inherent mobility of a vehicle. See J. HALL, supra note 24, at § 9:2 at 265.
In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), the Court recognized the auto exception
involving an inventory search and permitted incriminating evidence inadvertently discovered in
which excuse the need to obtain a warrant.
According to the Coolidge plurality, the plain view doctrine per-
mits the warrantless seizure by police of private possessions when
three requirements are satisfied. First, the initial intrusion that
brings the police within plain view of the object must itself, be law-
ful. 50 Second, the discovery of the incriminating object must be inad-
vertent.51 Third, it must be immediately apparent to the seizing of-
ficer that the object is incriminating.5" All consideration of the
doctrine must begin with the basic understanding that "plain view58
alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evi-
dence, ' '54 and no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless
search or seizure absent "exigent circumstances. '5 5 Furthermore, it
should be noted that "in the vast majority of cases, any evidence
seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of
seizure."' 6 Only if all three of the requirements are clearly satisfied
may the warrantless seizure be permitted under the plain view
plain view to be admissible in court. The word "automobile," however, "is not a talisman in
whose presence the fourth amendment fades away and disappears." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
461-62.
49. The theories proposed by the state did not represent a closed group of exceptions to
the warrant clause. The Court's analysis of warrantless searches and seizures represented a
scholarly effort to clarify the law in this area. Although the Coolidge Court seized the oppor-
tunity to explain the then current legal position of the exceptions, it did not find the facts of
the case to satisfy the requirements of any of the exceptions. 403 U.S. at 490.
50. The police officer must have prior justification for the intrusion that allowed him to
discover the evidence. Prior justification may include hot pursuit, warrant for another object,
search incident to arrest, or any other legitimate reason unconnected with the search, for being
present. 403 U.S. at 466.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (car pulled over for traffic viola-
tion, officer saw pistol bulge); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (agents lawfully pre-
sent with search warrant for another object).
51. The inadvertency requirement was deemed necessary in order to protect the individ-
ual against the evil of the "general warrant" involving exploratory rummaging until something
incriminating, at last, emerges. 403 U.S. at 466-67.
The need for inadvertency is comparable to the need for exigency, without which a war-
rantless search would be unreasonable. If an officer anticipates discovery of incriminating evi-
dence, he must obtain a warrant. Plain view cannot justify a seizure that could have been
accomplished pursuant to a valid warrant. The plain view doctrine is not inconsistent with the
Court's preference for warrants. Id.
52. Proper application of the plain view doctrine requires that the item in question must
be recognized as seizable by virtue of its being open and visible to the observer. Plain view of
an object does not justify seizure without a warrant. The most difficult situation occurs when
an item is observed that is barely recognizable as contraband and is extremely suspicious look-
ing. Federal Courts have exhibited a fairly liberal attitude toward this requirement. See
Kuipers, Suspicious Objects, Probable Cause and the Law of Search and Seizure, 21 DRAKE
L. REV. 252 (1972). [hereinafter cited as Suspicious Objects].
53. Objects falling into the plain view of an officer, who has a right to be in the position
to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be used as evidence. But plain view of the
object is not a search. There is a distinction between observing an object in plain view and
finding an object through a search. Compare Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (full view
of marijuana did not constitute a search) with United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932) (exploration of desks and cabinets seen in full view constituted an illegal search).
54. 403 U.S. at 468 (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 468.
56. Id. at 465 (emphasis added by the court).
doctrine.
Although never adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court, 7
the doctrine has been generally accepted when applied in lower court
cases,58 however, virtually no in depth analysis of the three require-
ments has been developed in these lower court opinions." Moreover,
since Coolidge, the Supreme Court has not had the occasion to de-
velop the limits of the plain view doctrine. The Court has made ref-
erence to the doctrine in subsequent opinions6" but plain view has
never been the sole6' justification for the reasonableness decisions in
these cases.
For example, in Washington v. Chrisman,"2 the Court held that
a police officer's accompaniment of a lawful arrestee to his residence
and subsequent seizure of contraband in plain view was not violative
of the fourth amendment. The officer was allowed to seize the in-
criminating object because he discovered it in a place where he was
lawfully entitled to be. The plain view doctrine would not have au-
thorized the officer to enter the dwelling without a warrant to seize
the contraband merely because it was visible from outside63 the
57. 103 S. Ct. at 1540.
58. The doctrine has been applied in many lower court decisions and frequently, plain
view has been stated as the sole justification for lawful warrantless seizures. Se, e.g., United
States v. Pugh, 566 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1010 (1978) (view of
book entitled "Cocaine Users Handbook"); United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50 (9th Cir.
1974) (notebook used for recording drug weights and prices).
59. Few lower court opinions have developed analysis of the Coolidge requirements. For
some limited discussion of the requirements, see United States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1352 (9th
Cir. 1982) (immediately apparent); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1981)
("plain feel" version of plain view doctrine); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.
1971) (valid prior intrusion). See also United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir. 1979)
(immediately apparent requirement discussed but seizure justified on grounds other than plain
view doctrine).
60. Since Coolidge, many cases have discussed fourth amendment principles, however,
references to plain view in these instances has been limited to discussion of the visibility of an
item subject to warrantless seizure. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (automo-
bile search and diminished expectation of privacy); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
(seizure pursuant to felony arrest); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (arrest and
seizure pursuant to informant's tip); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)
(display of items for public view provides no legitimate expectation of privacy); Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (exigency of burning building).
61. See infra note 58.
62. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
63. The hardest conceptual problem attending the plain view doctrine is to grasp
that it is not a universal statement of the right of a policeman to seize after
seeing something in open view; it is rather a limited statement of that right in
one of its several instances-following a valid intrusion.
455 U.S. at 12 n.4 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting The Plain View Doctrine, supra note 38, at
1096).
The difficulty of the area is attributed to the poorly chosen terms used in Harris v. Untied
States, 390 U.S. 234, 235 (1968); "It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
Seeing something in open view does not, of course, dispose, ipso facto, of the
problem of crossing constitutionally protected thresholds. Those who thought-
lessly over apply the plain view doctrine to every situation where there is a visual
dwelling." This is settled law.05 Coolidge emphasized that the plain
view doctrine applies only after a lawful search is in progress or the
officer was otherwise legally present at the place of the seizure."6 The
Chrisman Court did not specifically cite the plain view doctrine as
justification for the warrantless seizure, 7 but it did refer to the case
as "a classic instance of incriminating evidence found in plain view
when a police officer, for unrelated but entirely legitimate reasons,
obtains lawful access to an individual's area of privacy."68 The
fourth amendment did not prohibit the seizure in this case.
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the "inadver-
tency" issue of the plain view doctrine since the Coolidge decision
was handed down in 1971."9 The requirement was included70 to rein-
force the importance of obtaining a warrant71 as protection against
an invasion of an individual's privacy right as protected by the
fourth amendment. A seizure 7 that invokes the application of the
plain view doctrine involves an intrusion of a possessory interest78 not
a privacy interest,7 4 which Justice Stewart determined to be a "mi-
nor peril to fourth amendment protection 7 5 compared with a "major
gain in effective law enforcement."17 6 Justice White, in his dissenting
opinion in Coolidge, argued that the inadvertency requirement only
added more confusion to an already confused area of the law."
open view have not yet learned the simple lesson long since mastered by old
hands at the burlesque houses, "You can't touch everything you can see."
The Plain View Doctrine, supra note 38 at 1096.
64. 455 U.S. at I I (White, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. 403 U.S. at 467.
67. The Chrisman Court did not identify the specific exception that justified the seizure,
but the Court did determine that the seizure was lawful. 455 U.S. at 9.
68. Id.
69. Ironically, the Coolidge Court was deeply divided on the inadvertency issue. See
infra note 77 and accompanying text.
70. Obvious dissatisfaction by several members of the Court concerning the exclusionary
rule and its application led Justice Stewart to include the inadvertency requirement. Note,
Fruits of the Search of Defendant's Automobile Suppressed Due to Unconstitutional Search
and Seizure, 48 CHI. [-] KENT L. REv. 298, 302 (1971).
71. Conversely, the Court recognized that once a lawful search is in process and incrimi-
nating evidence is discovered inadvertently, it would be a needless inconvenience and some-
times dangerous to require the police to ignore the object until they have obtained a warrant,
which describes the discovered evidence. 403 U.S. at 467-68.
72. "The plain view doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching
.Id. at 466. See supra note 53.
73. Warrantless Searches, supra note 30, at 26.
74. The plain view doctrine could not be applied at the outset if the initial intrusion was
unlawful or fourth amendment privacy interests were at stake. See 403 U.S. at 515 (White, J.,
dissenting).
75. 403 U.S. at 467.
76. Id.
77. "[T]he inadvertence rule is unnecessary to further any fourth amendment ends and
will accomplish nothing." 403 U.S. at 517 (white, J., dissenting). Justice White asserted that
the requirement was inconsistent with previous Supreme Court decisions citing particularly
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). He
suggested a hypothetical to exemplify his dissatisfaction:
After Coolidge, the Supreme Court's only discussion of the "im-
mediate apparency"' 8 requirement has been in the form of dissents
to denials of petitions for writ of certiorari. 9 In Crouch v. United
States,80 Justice White once again expressed his dissatisfaction with
the plain view doctrine."' The Crouch case presented the question of
"how plain objects in plain view must be"8 2 in order to justify a war-
rantless search or seizure.83 In the absence of authoritative direc-
tion 4 from the Supreme Court, 85 lower courts have upheld seizures
under the plain view exception despite something less than instanta-
neous recognition8  of the object's relevance as evidence of crime.
87
Let us suppose officers secure a search warrant to search a house for a rifle.
While staying well within the range of a rifle search, they discover two photo-
graphs of the murder victim, both in plain sight in the bedroom. Assume also
that the discovery of the one photograph was inadvertent but finding the other
was anticipated. The Court would permit the seizure of only one of the photo-
graphs. But in terms of the "minor" peril to fourth amendment values there is
surely no difference between these two photographs: the interference with posses-
sion is the same in each case and the officers' appraisal of the photograph they
expected to see is no less reliable than their judgment about the other. And in
both situations the actual inconvenience and danger to evidence remain identical
if the officers must depart and secure a warrant ....
403 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
78. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), lays the foundation for the immedi-
ate apparency requirement. A search warrant for liquor and articles needed for the manufac-
ture of liquor did not authorize the seizure of a ledger and bills, which indicated a bootlegging
business, discovered in plain view during a search. Id. at 193.
79. See United States v. Sedillo, 496 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
947 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (seizure of check in envelop from pocket based on belief
that it was a Treasury check); Gentile v. United States, 493 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 979 (1979) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (check, partially obscured by clothing,
seized during lawful search for other items). Accord United States v. Hunt, 366 F. Supp. 17
(N.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 505 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. 648 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 952 (1981).
81. A warrant was issued to allow police officers to search for paraphernalia used in the
illegal manufacture of drugs. During the search, personal letters were discovered in plain view.
The court held that the seizure of the letters was proper under the plain view doctrine: "Brief
persual of an item does not render its incriminating nature any the less immediately appar-
ent." 648 F.2d at 934. Justice White questioned the application of the doctrine when docu-
ments had to be read. 454 U.S. at 952 (White, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. A number of circuit courts have held that a plain view seizure of certain documents
is permissible even though their incriminating nature is not apparent absent a reading of the
contents. See, e.g., United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) (loansharking records
on loose ledger sheets and index cards); United States v. Pugh, 566 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1977)
(stationary with drug weights and price quotations); United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50
(9th Cir. 1974) (notebook for recording weights of marijuana bricks); United States v.
Gargotto, 476 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1973) (betting records).
Some writings may be so incriminating on their face that even a casual glance would
reveal this character; others may require extensive reading. 454 U.S. at 956 (White, J.,
dissenting).
84. Attempts have been made to rephrase the immediately apparent requirement, e.g.,
United States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 1977), but in United States v. Diaz,
577 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1978), the Court held that "in so confused an area, it seems best to
stick to the exact language of the Supreme Court's plurality opinion rather than to embroider
it even slightly."
85. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569-72 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring), (dis-
cussing the immediate apparency requirement.)
86. See supra note 83.
Texas v. Brown stands as the first United States Supreme
Court88 case to consider the scope and applicability of the plain view
doctrine as it was articulated in Coolidge. Although courts have
characterized the doctrine as an independent exception to the war-
rant requirement,8" the Brown Court found that characterization to
be "somewhat inaccurate," 0 and further held the doctrine simply to
be an extension of whatever prior justification the officer had to ob-
tain access to the object subject to the seizure. 91
The Justices unanimously agreed" that under the plain view
doctrine, the seizure of the balloon did not violate the warrant re-
quirement, because the police officer had probable cause to believe
the balloon contained an illegal substance, even though the substance
itself was not visible.93 Although the Court agreed in judgment, it
failed to express a conclusive definition or complete clarification of
the issues concerning the plain view exception to the warrant re-
quirement as handed down in Coolidge.94
Rendering the decision of the Court, Justice Rehnquist deter-
mined that the three requirements necessary to invoke the applica-
tion of the plain view doctrine were satisfied.98 First, there was no
dispute that the police officer's initial stop of the vehicle constituted
a valid intrusion.9" Second, there was no question that the license
87. United States v. Cresher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1357 n.2 (1982).
88. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is indisputable. The decision of the Court of Crim-
inal Appeals is based on the interpretation of the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution and on Texas cases interpreting the plain view doctrine as established in Coo-
lidge. Brown's argument, based on Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935), that the
decision below rested on independent state grounds, is untenable. The Texas cases cited all rely
on Coolidge including: Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); DeLeo v.
State, 550 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977); Nichols v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 103 S. Ct. at 1535
n. 1.
89. Commentators also refer to the doctrine as an independent exception. See, e.g.,
Note, "Plain View" and the "Plain View Doctrine," 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 290, 291 (1982).
90. 103 S. Ct. at 1540.
91. Id. at 1541.
92. Unanimous only in application of the plain view doctrine to the facts of this case.
The three concurrences are indicative of the Justices' different theories and viewpoints on the
doctrine as handed down in Coolidge. The lack of unity is also reminiscent of the lack of
agreement by the court in the Coolidge decision and the traditional conflict among the Justices
when confronted with fourth amendment issues. See supra note 46.
93. The police officer did not have to see the contents to make a lawful seizure based on
probable cause that the contents were incriminating. See infra note 99.
94. The Court recognized that the Coolidge decision is not binding precedent, however,
the Court used Coolidge as a reference point for further discussion of the plain view doctrine.
103 S. Ct. at 1540.
95. Id. at 1543.
96. Neither the Court of Criminal Appeals nor the Supreme Court questioned the valid-
ity of the initial stop at the license checkpoint, relying on Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979) (detailed opinion discussing fourth amendment reasonableness standards involved in
stopping an automobile and detaining the driver) as a precedent for their conclusion. Cf.
United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (border vehicle stops); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border patrol checkpoint operations).
checkpoint was any sort of pretext" to effect unlawful seizures or
that the discovery of the balloon was anything but inadvertent. 8
Last, based on his professional experience," it was immediately ap-
parent to the police officer that the balloon was subject to seizure.100
The officer had only to apply the common sense standard of probable
cause, based on his expertise, to the observation of the balloon' to
determine that it was evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure. 10 2 In spite of the Coolidge plain view require-
ments being satisfied, the Supreme Court was unable to reach com-
plete agreement regarding the parameters of the doctrine.
Justice Rehnquist posited that the key issue to be resolved in a
plain view seizure case is whether or not the intrusion, which enabled
the police officer to perceive and physically seize the property in
question, was initially valid' 03-a factual determination. Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that, in fact, the rule as articulated in Coo-
lidge "merely reflects an application of the fourth amendment's cen-
tral requirement of reasonableness to the law governing the seizures
of property." 104 Plain view principles are grounded on the recogni-
tion that only possessory interests are involved' 0 at the moment of
seizure, and obtaining a warrant under the circumstances would be a
"needless inconvenience."' 0
The Brown Court, in considering the uncertainty surrounding
the phrase "immediately apparent," recognized that the use of the
phrase was "very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it can be
taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the
incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for an application of
the 'plain view' doctrine.' 0 7
97. The record showed that there existed no more than a generalized expectation that
the cars halted would contain narcotics or paraphernalia. Moreover, the record indicated no
reason to believe that the officer expected that there would be anything in particular in
Brown's glove compartment. 103 S. Ct. at 1543.
98. Id. at 1540.
99. The Court noted, "The fact that Maples could not see through the opaque fabric of
the balloon is all but irrelevant, the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as
to its contents-particularly to the trained eye of the officer." Id. at 1543.
100. Id.
101. The unique character of the item was dispositive of its incriminating nature and
seizability. Id. at 1543. See United States v. Jiminez-Badilla, 434 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1970)
(heroin filled condom seen during narcotics arrest); United States v. Thweatt, 433 F.2d 122
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (stolen clothing seen during warrant arrest for burglary and larceny). See
also United States v. Titus, 445 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1971) (discovery while in another room to
obtain an item of clothing for arrested person).
102. 103 S. Ct. at 1543.
103. Id. at 1540.
104. Id. at 1541.
105. The Brown Court, interpreting Coolidge, determined that "when a police officer
has observed an object in 'plain view', the owner's remaining interests in the object are merely
those of possession and ownership." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1542.
In an earlier case, Payton v. New York, 08 the Supreme Court
established a standard of probable cause for seizure in the ordinary
sense consistent with the fourth amendment."0 9 The Brown Court ap-
plied the Payton standard"0 in determining that a police officer must
evaluate the facts and circumstances of the situation and make a
common sense determination"' whether the object in plain view may
be contraband or evidence of a crime." 2 Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that the immediate apparency requirement does not require the of-
ficer to know or be possessed of near certainty that the item is seiza-
ble,"8 he need only possess probable cause to believe the item is in-
criminating by its nature."
4
The Brown Court offered limited analysis concerning the inad-
vertency requirement, but concluded that clearly, the requirement
was no bar to the application of the plain view doctrine in this
case."" Justice White, in his concurring opinion, maintained his
traditional position"' that the inadvertency requirement is not neces-
sary to establish the validity of the plain view seizure.
"1
Justice Rehnquist did not find the initial stop," 8 the use of the
flashlight," 9 or the officer's shift of position'" invasive of any legiti-
mate expectations of privacy or in any way violative of the fourth
108. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
109. [lIt is also well settled that objects such as weapons or contraband found in
a public place may be seized by police without a warrant. The seizure of prop-
erty in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasona-
ble, assuming there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity.
445 U.S. at 586-87.
110. The probable cause standards articulated in Payton are applied as persuasive dicta.
111. The Brown Court emphasized that probable cause is a flexible, common sense stan-
dard. A "practical, nontechnical" probability is all that is required. Brinegan v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). The Brown Court applied the language of probable cause standards
set forth in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). 103 S. Ct. at 1543.
1 12. The Brown Court cited Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. I (198 1), as an example of
a case in which the facts supplied the officer with probable cause, and therefore, the officer
could seize incriminating items from the car without a warrant. The occupants of the car
matched the description of persons suspected of a theft. 103 S. Ct. at 1542.
113. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the immediately apparent requirement
was central to the plain view doctrine. The lower court held that "Officer Maples had to know
that 'incriminating evidence' was before him when he seized the balloon." 617 S.W.2d at 200
(quoting DeLeo v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)).
114. 103 S. Ct. at 1542. The Brown Court did not address whether, in some circum-
stances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure
in certain cases. Id. at n.7.
115. 103 S. Ct. at 1543.
116. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
117. 103 S. Ct. at 1544 (White, J., concurring).
118. See supra note 96.
119. "Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field
glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution." United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563
(1927). See supra note 48.
120. The general public can look into an automobile from any angle. There is no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy or violation of the fourth amendment. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347,
361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
amendment. By limiting his discussion of the validity of the initial
intrusion requirement to a statement1 ' that the requirement was
satisfied, Justice Rehnquist added little to the development of limita-
tions or analysis of that aspect of the plain view doctrine.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell agreed with the judg-
ment of the Court and the application of the doctrine. However, he
found the plurality's consideration of the purpose of the fourth
amendment to be lacking. 22 Justice Powell emphasized the need to
exercise caution when extending the scope of exceptions to the war-
rant-requirement clause. In addition, Justice Powell maintained that
the plain view doctrine has been accepted generally for over a dec-
ade, 123 and at this juncture, there is no reason to cast doubt on the
Coolidge plurality opinion. Justice Powell opined that if probable
cause'2 4 must exist, the facts of this case clearly satisfied the require-
ments as set forth in the Payton dicta.
Justice Stevens, 2 6 in his concurring opinion, declared that fur-
ther explanation of the plurality's probable cause requirement is nec-
essary, and that inadequate consideration was given to earlier Su-
preme Court cases involving the seizure of closed containers. 26
Focusing on interests protected by the fourth amendment, Justice
Stevens asserted that a privacy interest 27 is at stake when a closed
container is observed in plain view, subject to seizure, and opened on
the spot. In this case, however, Justice Stevens expressed no doubt
concerning the propriety of the warrantless seizure of the balloon,2 8
because by its very nature, the officer clearly had probable cause to
believe it contained an illicit substance. Nonetheless, justification to
search 29 must be established in order to protect an individual's rea-
121. Justice Rehnquist noted that there was no dispute as to the presence of the first of
the three requirements held necessary to invoke the plain view doctrine, citing United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), to reinforce his opinion. 103 S. Ct. at 1542 n.6.
122. Justice Powell stated, "As I read the opinion, it appears to accord less significance
to the warrant clause of the fourth amendment than is justified by the language and purpose of
that amendment." 103 S. Ct. at 1544 (Powell, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 1545 (Powell, J., concurring). See supra note 58.
124. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (considering how probable cause
affects law enforcement officials.)
Justice Powell commented that the Court was not advised of any innocent item that is
commonly carried in uninflated tied off balloons. 103 S. Ct. at 1545 (Powell, J., concurring).
125. Justice Stevens took a different and much more detailed approach to the analysis of
the plain view doctrine than any of the other opinion writers.
126. For further consideration of closed container cases see United States v. Ross, 102
S. Ct. 2157 (1982) (closed paper bag in auto search); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 735
(1979) (suitcase seizure pursuant to informants tip); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977) (footlocker searched pursuant to arrest).
127. Justice Stevens separated the interests in jeopardy during an unlawful search and
seizure, and determined that the danger in more difficult plain view cases, where the view is
not entirely public, is a further invasion of privacy, as in the case of a closed container. 103 S.
Ct. at 1546 (Stevens, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. Justice Stevens reiterated the Supreme Court's warrant preference. Id.
sonable expectation of privacy in closed container cases. °30 Justice
Stevens recognized that a factual determination' 3' must be made
concerning the nature of the container and the expectation of privacy
involved.
In Coolidge, the Supreme Court enunciated the plain view ex-
ception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment, but
under the facts of that case the doctrine was inapplicable. The
Brown Court, on the other hand, applied the plain view doctrine to
the facts of the instant case and found the exception applicable.
Brown and Coolidge represent unlawful seizure cases where the
plain view doctrine was applied, but different facts and circum-
stances affected different results. By their very nature, search and
seizure cases are of limited precedential value. 3 2 Therefore, the
scope and applicability of the plain view doctrine must be deter-
mined in accordance with the unique set of facts of each case. 33
Brown v. Texas adds dimension and clarity"' to the plain view doc-
trine, but it does not advance a dramatic change to any particular
body of law. It would be presumptuous to suggest, in light of the
endless factual variations which are possible in search and seizure
cases, that the Supreme Court will never again need to evaluate the
doctrine.
The probable cause standard articulated by Justice Rehnquist
supplied necessary guidance to pattern the conduct of law enforce-
ment officials and courts' 318 on the occasion of an unauthorized
seizure. Police officers and suppression hearing'" judges must make
decisions based on reasonable common sense standards of probable
cause. Constitutional law requires a balancing of interests: to de-
mand a police officer to make a decision based on a higher standard
than reasonable probable cause would suggest unfairly that individ-
130. Although plain view does not involve a search, opening a closed container does
involve a search. Conversely, Justice Stevens pointed out, the fact that an object is visible does
not automatically mean that it is in plain view in the sense that no invasion of privacy occurs.
103 S. Ct. at 1547 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring). See Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. i
(1932) (police officer unlawful intrusion).
131. 103 S. Ct. at 1545 (Powell, J., concurring).
132. There is a proliferation of precedent, but varying factual backgrounds render cases
containing fourth amendment issues even more confusing. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 26, at 14.
133. The fourth amendment forbids "unreasonable searches and seizures, and this obvi-
ously depends on the facts of the case," E. GRISWOLD, supra note 25, at 9.
134. The unanimous judgment indicates an appreciation of the application requirements
of the plain view doctrine, however, the concurring opinions indicate there is still room for
clarity. Nonetheless, the Court exhibited a much greater willingness to accept the doctrine in
Brown than in Coolidge, even taking into consideration Justice White's aversion to the inad-
vertency requirement. See supra note 46.
135. For a discussion of standards for probable cause, see generally Suspicious Objects,
supra note 52.
136. The inadvertency requirement could cause some troublesome proof problems at a
suppression hearing. See Note, Search and Seizure of an Automobile in Plain View, 85 HARv.
L. REV. 237 (1971).
ual interests are greater than the promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests. Criminal law requires a balancing of interests: to
demand a police officer to make a decision based on a higher stan-
dard than reasonable probable cause would suggest unfairly that a
criminal's expectations of privacy are greater than society's expecta-
tions of criminal justice.
In Texas v. Brown, the Supreme court exhibited its traditional
reluctance to promulgate automatic exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. The issue in Brown was whether or not the seizure of the
green balloon was reasonable. Through the application of the plain
view doctrine the seizure was declared lawful. Texas v. Brown dem-
onstrates that the independence of exceptions to the warrant require-
ment is secondary to the Supreme Court's primary concern in fourth
amendment search and seizure cases-reasonableness.
FAMILY LAW-PATERNITY-HUMAN LEUKOCYTE ANTIGEN TEST
RESULTS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN PATERNITY CASES TO SHOW THE
LIKELIHOOD OF PATERNITY. Turek v. Hardy, - Pa. Super.
., 458 A.2d 562 (1983).
In Turek v. Hardy,' the Pennsylvania Superior Court2 held that
human leukocyte3 antigen4 (HLA)5 test results are admissible in pa-
ternity casesO to show that the accused is likely to be the father.' The
court predicated its decision upon the determination that "the relia-
bility of HLA tests has been established."8 By rejecting the tradi-
tional rule9 that blood tests are only admissible to prove non-pater-
nity,10 the court joined the ranks of a growing minority of appellate
courts, which admit confirmatory results."
The Turek case originated in the Fayette County court of com-
mon pleas. Mary Turek, the mother of an illegitimate child,"
I. - Pa. Super. -, 458 A.2d 562 (1983).
2. Justice Brosky wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Montgomery. Justice
Johnson filed a concurring opinion.
3. A "leukocyte" is defined as "a colorless blood corpuscel capable of ameboid move-
ment, whose chief function is to protect the body against microorganisms causing disease."
DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 379 (25th ed. 1980).
4. An "antigen" is a "foreign material that elicits the synthesis of a particular kind of
molecule, the antibody, within an organism." D. RITCHIE, BIOLOGY 630 (1979).
5. See infra note 17.
6. A paternity case is a civil "court action to prove that a person is the father of an
illegitimate child and to enforce support obligations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th
ed. 1979).
7. The court emphasized that although the test results are admissible to show the likeli-
hood of paternity, they are not conclusive. - Pa. Super. -, 458 A.2d 562, 565 (1983).
8. Id.
9. The traditional rule is based on the idea that blood test results show only that the
accused is a member of a portion of the population which could have fathered the child. See
Simons v. Jorg, 375 So. 2d 288 (Fla. App. 1979)(holding that blood tests are inadmissible for
inclusory purposes); Hurd v. State, 125 Ga. App. 353, 187 S.E. 2d 545 (1972) (holding that it
is reversible error to admit blood tests which do not establish non-paternity).
10. In Pennsylvania, blood tests that exclude the putative father are conclusive proof of
non-paternity. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6163 (Purdon 1982).
11. See, e.g., Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979)
(reversing trial court's refusal to admit confirmatory test results); Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan.
App. 2d 509, 644 P.2d 490 (1982); Commonwealth v. Blazo, 10 Mass. App. 13, 406 N.E.2d
1323 (1980) (trial court did not err in admitting testimony of doctor that, in his opinion, HLA
tests showed defendant was the father); Hennepin County Welfare Bd. v. Ayers, 304 N.W.2d
879 (Minn. 1981) (finding blood tests that tend to show paternity as admissible); Malvasi v.
Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2s 279 (1979) (holding HLA tests admissible for inclu-
sion); Commissioner of Social Serv. v. Lardo, 100 Misc. 2d 220, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1979)
(HLA tests are admissible).
12. The term "illegitimate child" is defined as a "[c]hild who is born at a time when his
parents, though alive, are not married to each other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (5th ed.
brought a paternity suit against Albert Hardy. Following a petition
by Hardy, on June 30, 1980 the trial court ordered"3 the plaintiff-
mother and her child to undergo testing to determine whether the
defendant could be excluded from the population that possibly could
be the father. On July 1, 1980, the parties agreed to a written stipu-
lation that the test results would be admissible at trial without fur-
ther need for expert testimony.
After the blood tests14 failed to exclude Hardy, the mother at-
tempted to introduce the results at trial. The lower court sustained
Hardy's objection to the admission of the results, holding that this
type of evidence first must be made admissible by the state
legislature.' 5
Ultimately, the jury found in favor of the defendant. The
mother then made a motion for a new trial on the ground that the
blood test results had been improperly excluded. After her motion
was denied, she appealed the decisions. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court granted the appeal to consider whether HLA test results
which indicate that an accused man is likely to be the father should
be admissible as some evidence of paternity.
1979). For an in-depth discussion concerning how the parameters of this definition are affected
by invalid marriages, marriages after birth, presumptions of legitimacy, common-law mar-
riages, artificial insemination, and voluntary acceptances of paternal responsibility, see H.
KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 10-19 (1971).
13. In Pennsylvania, courts are given the power to compel all the parties in a paternity
suit to submit to blood testing. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6133 (Purdon 1982). This statute
provides:
In any matter . . . in which paternity, parentage, or identity of a child is a
relevant fact, the court upon its own initiative . . . may, or upon motion of any
party to the action ... , shall order the mother, child, and putative father to
submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to such tests, the court may
resolve the question of paternity, parentage or identity . . . against such party,
or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
Id. Several cases have rejected attempts by defendants to avoid court ordered paternity tests.
For example, in Baily v. Richardson, 412 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the court
compelled the defendant to submit to testing after medical experts disparaged his claim that
he could not be tested because he had hepatitis. In L. v. B., 108 Misc. 2d 709, 438 N.Y.S. 2d
726 (1981), the court, relying on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), held that the
compelled paternity testing did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the
fourth amendment. Cf. Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406, 284 S.E. 2d 7 (1981) (holding that
compulsory blood testing in paternity suits does not force the accused to be a witness against
himself within the meaning of the fifth amendment).
14. The blood tests used in the case were those recommended by the American Medical
Association (AMA) in conjunction with the American Bar Association (ABA). Brief for Ap-
pellant at 8, Turek v. Hardy, - Pa. Super. -, 458 A.2d 562 (1983). These tests consist
of the ABO, Rh, MNSs, Kell, Duffy, Kidd, and HLA tests. Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell,
and Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of
Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Miale].
15. The trial court believed that although the present statute concerning blood testing
did not specifically bar the use of affirmative results as did the statute which it replaced, it
would be such a drastic departure from the prior law that the change must come from the
legislature. Brief for Appellant at 3, Turek v. Hardy, - Pa. Super. -, 458 A.2d 562
(1983). Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28 § 306 (Purdon 1957) (repealed 1976) with 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. 6131-6137 (Purdon 1982).
Although blood testing has been a major component of pater-
nity litigation for several years,' it traditionally has been restricted
to the role of exclusionary evidence. Recently, technical advances,
particularly the development of HLA testing, 7 have precipitated a
great deal of criticism about the dichotomy of treatment between
test results that indicate exclusion and those which indicate inclu-
sion.' A brief survey of the underlying technical considerations will
facilitate an evaluation of the validity of this legal distinction.
The differences between the inclusion and exclusion approaches
are more than semantic. The exclusion procedure comprises the
identification of certain genetic markers' 9 in the blood20 of the
16. An early example of the use of blood testing in Pennsylvania to disprove paternity is
found in Commonwealth v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931). In this case, the court
ordered a new bastardy trial based upon expert testimony that clinical blood tests had proved
that the accused could not have been the father.
17. HLA testing refers to the typing (identification) of human leukocyte antigens
"which is loosely referred to as tissue typing." I. DAVIDSON & J. BERNARD, TODD-SANFORD
CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS BY LABORATORY METHODS 411 (15th ed. 1974). HLA testing was devel-
oped in 1964 by Dr. Paul Terasaki as a means of ascertaining donor-donee compatability with
respect to organ transplants, particularly kidney transplants. Comment, Paternity Testing with
the Human Leukocyte Antigen System: A Medicolegal Breakthrough, 20 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 511, 519 (1980). As the amount of identifiable HLA markers increased over the years,
the test became a significant tool for paternity testing. The HLA test can often exclude up to
90% of falsely accused men, even when the HLA test is not used in conjunction with other
tests. The traditional tests were only capable of excluding 70% of falsely accused men. Miller,
HLA Serotyping in Cases of Disputed Paternity, 1978 AM. A. BLOOD BANKS WORKSHOP ON
PATERNITY TESTING 55.
18. The most prominent and outspoken of these critics, Dr. Terasaki of the University of
California at Los Angeles, charges that "[t]he HLA tissue typing system is so powerful in
determining the probability of paternity that many of the older rules of evidence now require
complete revision." Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Ex-
cluded By ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1977-8). Another commentator asserts, "The
legal profession has an obligation to keep pace with qualified advances in the scientific commu-
nity. The use of HLA inclusionary blood test results will serve the ends of justice by replacing
emotion with scientific fact. Comment, supra note 17, at 531. Contra Majumder and
Masatoshi, A Note on Positive Identification of Paternity by Using Genetic Markers, 33
HUMAN GENETICS 29 (1983) (emphatically recommending that courts use paternity tests only
for exclusion until better methods can be developed) [hereinafter cited as Majumder].
19. "Genetic markers" are "the personal characteristics inherited from the parents and
controlled by genes on a pair of chromosomes." Lee, Current Status of Paternity Testing, 9
FAM. L. Q. 615, 616 (1975).
20. The traditional battery of tests used for paternity determination (ABO, Rh, MNSs,
Kell, Duffy, and Kidd) can only be performed on red blood cells. HLA testing, however, is not
restricted to blood cell (white) typing, but can also be performed on tissue samples because
"HLA antigens have been demonstrated on the membranes of nucleated cells: different types
of leukocytes, platelets, and cells in the spleen, liver, kidney, skin, and placenta." 1. DAVIDSON
& J. BERNARD, supra note 17, at 410. This seemingly unimpressive distinction has been clev-
erly exploited by some courts to circumvent statutes which preclude the affirmative use of
blood test results. For example, the Supreme Court of Utah posited that "HLA tests are not
necessarily properly characterized as blood tests. Antigens may be found in most tissues of the
body, including the liver and kidneys, as well as component parts of the blood." Phillips v.
Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1223 (Utah 1980). The classification of HLA tests as tissue-tests is
judicial ingenuity at its best. An expert on paternity testing scoffs at this legal manipulation,
noting that while tissue typing is done on transplant patients, these procedures "are expensive
.. .and would not be feasible for paternity testing." Interview with Dr. Lyndall Molthan,
Medical Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Miller Memorial Blood Center in Bethle-
hem, Pennsylvania (Sept. 23, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Interview].
mother,"1 child, and putative father; followed by the application of
"Mendelian rules of inheritance"' 2 to determine whether it would be
genetically impossible for the accused to be the biological father. An
exclusion may occur in two ways. First, the child may possess a ge-
netic characteristic which had to have come from someone other
than the defendant."3 Second, the child may lack a genetic marker
that he would have to possess if the accused were the father. 4 In
either of these situations, the defendant is conclusively proved inno-
cent without any statistical estimations. In many cases, the possibil-
ity of exclusion may approach 99% when several genetic marker sys-
tems are used.' 5 The credibility of the exclusion method is beyond
reproach in the scientific community,' 6 and most courts will accept
results indicating non-paternity as conclusive proof."'
21. Even if the mother were unavailable for testing, it may still be possible to exclude
the putative father. The accused would be excluded if there were an "existence of incompatible
phenotypes between the child and alleged father. ... Lee, Lebeck and Pothiawala, Exclu-
sion of Paternity Testing Without Testing the Mother, 77 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 809
(Dec. 1980). In some cases, the chance of exclusion is "as high as 88% even without the
mother's being tested." Id. at 812.
22. The term "Mendelian analysis" refers to the application of the rules of genetic in-
heritance as hypothesized by Johann (Gregor) Mendel, a nineteenth century priest who con-
ducted the first successful study of genetics. These rules are as follows:
a) Individual units called genes . . . function as pairs to determine heredi-
tary traits. One member of the pair is contributed by each parent.
b) Any diploid cell contains two genes for any particular trait, these genes
may be alike (homozygous) or different (hetrozygous).
c) Alternative versions of genes are called alleles.
d) If the two alleles are different, the dominant one will be expressed ....
e) One member of each pair of alleles is segregated into a gamete. . . .One
member is just as likely as another to go into a given gamete.
f) Gametes are united randomly during fertilization, and the distribution of
traits among offspring is predictable if the genotype of the parent is known. In-
herited traits are therefore varied but predictable.
D. RITCHIE, BIOLOGY 236 (1979). See generally A. WINCHESTER, GENETICS: A SURVEY OF
THE PRINCIPLES OF HEREDITY (5th ed. 1977).
23. This type of exclusion, referred to as a "first-order exclusion," is predicated on the
rule of inheritance that "a character cannot appear in the child unless present in one or both of
the parents." Tippett, Blood Group Genetics and Paternity Tests, 1978 AM. A. BLOOD BANKS
WORKSHOP ON PATERNITY TESTING 1. Because of this rule, it is even possible to exclude the
putative father without his being tested. This could occur if the parents of the putative father
were tested, and failed to account for a character which the father must have contributed.
Interview, supra note 20.
24. The Mendelian rule that applies to this situation provides:
A man is excluded if characters which he must pass on are not present in
the child; if he is hetrozygous for two "allelic" antigens, one of the antigens
should appear in the blood of the child. (for example, an AB man cannot have
an 0 child): failure to obey this rule is a second-order exclusion.
Tippett, supra note 23, at 1.
25. E.g., Lee, Lebeck, and Pothiawala, supra note 21, at 812.
26. E.g., Peterson, A Few Things You Should Know About Paternity Suits (But Were
Afraid to Ask), 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 667, 669-70 (1982).
27. See, e.g., Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 7 Cal. Rptr. 1296, 354 P.2d 657 (1960)
(blood tests that exclude the husband are conclusive proof of non-paternity and may even
overcome a presumption of legitimacy). But see State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 209 S.E. 2d 754
(1974) (holding blood test results showing non-paternity are only to be considered along with
other evidence).
The controversy occurs when blood tests are used to show that
the defendant is likely to be the father.28 Basically, the inclusion pro-
cedure commences where the exclusion procedure terminates. In
other words, when the typing stage (the method described above as
the "exclusion method") fails to exclude the accused, a statistical
estimation of his "likelihood of paternity"29 is calculated. 0 This cal-
culation entails the use of a probability formula known as the
"Essen-Moller" version of the "Bayes' Theorem." 1 A simplified ver-
sion of this formula may be summarized as follows: The ratio of the
likelihood that the accused contributed certain genetic characteris-
tics identified in the child, to the likelihood that one other "random
man" contributed them.32 The "random man" variable is derived
from the estimated frequencies 8 of the particular characteristics in
the relevant population. 4 The ratio yielded by the Bayes' formula,
called the "paternity index," is converted into a percentage value,
"the likelihood of paternity," which is then presented to the trier of
facts.3 5 The "likelihood of paternity" will be over 90% for most men
28. In a case in which the United States Supreme Court invalidated a one-year statute
of limitations on paternity suits, the majority observed that "[m]ore recent developments in
the field of blood testing have sought not only to 'prove non-paternity' but also to predict
paternity with a high degree of probability. . . . The proper evidentiary weight to be given to
these techniques is still a matter of academic dispute." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 96
n.2 (1982).
29. The "likelihood of paternity" is not the same as the "probability of exclusion." The
"probability of exclusion" refers to the likelihood that any random man would be excluded by
the blood tests. On the other hand, the "likelihood of paternity" is the probability that a non-
excluded man is actually the father. Ellman and Keyes, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA
and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131, 1141 (1979). For a case
discussing the difference between "probability of exclusion" and "likelihood of paternity", see
Imms v. Clark, - Mo. App. -, 654 S.W.2d 281 (1983).
30. E.g., Miller, supra note 17, at 84.
31. The "Bayes' Theorem" is a standard probability formula used for determining the
likelihood of an event's occurence. The "Essen-Mollen formula" is a variation of the Bayes'
Theorem which is specifically adapted for determining the likelihood of paternity. Selvin, The
Probability of Exclusion of Likelihood of Guilt of an Accused: Paternity, 23 J. FORENSIC SCI.
Soc'Y. 19, 23 (1983). "Although a straightforward consequence of the concept of conditional
probability, the Bayes' Theorem has far reaching implications in the development of a certain
philosophy of statistical inference designated Bayesion inference." BHArrACHARYYA & JOHN-
SON, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS AND METHODS 94 (1977). The Bayes' Theorem has been criti-
cized because it requires the experimentalist to make some pre-experimental estimations for
which data may be totally lacking. Id. at 94-95.
32. In more technical terms, this ratio is "the probability of non-exclusion associated
with the assumption that the child's phenotype arose from a man whose genetic makeup was
the same as the putative father divided by the probability that the child's phenotype arose
from a randomly selected male." Selvin, supra note 31, at 21. For an unabridged version of the
formula, and a thorough explanation, see generally Eliman and Keyes, supra note 29, at 1147-
51.
33. Genetic "frequency" refers to the incidence of the particular genetic markers that
the accused could have contributed in the given population. Lee, Current Status of Paternity
Testing, 9 FAM. L. Q. 615, 617 (1975).
34. It must be emphasized that the relevant population is the local population. This is
because the frequencies are affected by ethnic concentrations, and consequently vary from one
geographical location to another. Even different counties within the same state will have differ-
ent frequencies. Interview, supra note 20.
35. One article suggests that there may be better ways of presenting this data to the
not excluded by HLA typing."s
It is important to note that two major assumptions are implicit
in the structure of this statistical calculation. First, it is assumed
that the accused had intercourse with the mother.37 Second, it is as-
sumed that the defendant had a 50% opportunity to father the
child.38
The incorporation of a 50% assumption of guilt into the analysis
is one of the most controversial aspects of the inclusion approach.",
Some critics question the validity of the "likelihood of paternity"
formula because it ignores significant variables, including the fre-
quency of intercourse, the fertility cycle, and the use of contracep-
tives.4 0 The statistical analysis has also been questioned for more
technical reasons, including the inadequacy of knowledge concerning
the possibility of "gametic disequilibrium, ' 4 1 and the inadequacy of
jury, including informing the jury of the medical evidence without any statistical manipula-
tions or presenting the information in chart form. See Ellman and Keyes, supra note 29, at
1144-52.
36. E.g., Miller, supra note 17, at 55.
37. E.g., Peterson, supra note 26, at 669.
38. The calculation begins with the premise that the accused and one random man had
access to the mother. E.g., Comment, supra note 17, at 523.
39. One writer criticizes that "making such an assumption insures that in every case in
which any recognized blood test does not exclude the defendant, one will find that he is proba-
bly the father." ElIman and Keyes, supra note 29, at 1152. Another critic notes that the
statistical analysis "contains the implicit assumption that half the men charged in a paternity
action without regard to genetic evidence are guilty (certainly an equivocal assumption)." Sel-
vin, supra note 31, at 24. For a detailed criticism of the application of the Bayes' Theorem to
the determination of the likelihood of paternity, see Langency, Probability of Paternity: Use-
less, 27 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 558 (1975). One paradoxical aspect of the 50% assumption
is worth noting. The 50% constant tends to skew the results to the detriment of a man who has
never had access to the woman, because his real prior probability is 0%. Conversely, if the
accused were the only man to have had access to the mother, his real prior probability is
necessarily 100%. The constant will skew the results in his favor.
40. Comment, supra note 17, at 524. These considerations all tend to undercut the va-
lidity of the "equal opportunity" assumption. It should be emphasized that the "equal opportu-
nity" assumption does more than assume that the putative father and one random man both
had intercourse with the mother; it is an assumption that each man's sperm had an equal
opportunity to fertilize the egg.
41. The formula is based on the assumption that each genetic characteristic is inherited
independently of each other characteristic. The probabilities with respect to each individual
marker are multiplied together to arrive at the overall paternity index. This assumes that these
markers are randomly distributed throughout the population. A simplified example may help
to clarify this point. If "A" and "B" markers, in conjunction with other markers, were inde-
pendently distributed throughout the population, and each of the two markers were found in
half the population, the probability of finding an "AB" person would be (A) - (B) = .
This idea is a basic assumption of the formula. A very recent scientific article questions the
validity of the assumption of independent assortment of alleles, especially with respect to the
HLA system. See Charkroborty and Hedrick, Paternity Exclusion and the Paternity Index for
Two Linked Loci, 33 HUMAN HEREDITY 13 (1983). This study questions whether certain
markers may tend to be found together more often than if they were totally independent. See
id. In technical terms this phenomenon is referred to as the "recombination fraction" and
"gametic disequilibrium." See id. In terms of the above example, if "A" and "B" were always
found together (an exaggeration), the "AB" characteristic would be found in one-half the
population, not one-quarter. The article indicates that the recombination fraction would affect
the paternity index considerably in certain cases. See id. at 19-20.
"frequency" data.42 In addition to the controversy surrounding the
statistical analysis,4 the practical capabilities of the laboratory test-
ing have been questioned.""
As one can glean from this cursory overview of the technical
controversies surrounding the use of HLA testing for inclusion, the
issues confronting the Turek court were more complex than a mere
question of whether one piece of evidence could be used for two dif-
ferent reasons.45
In most states,46 the admissibility of blood test results in pater-
nity suits is covered by statute. Several states allow inclusion results
to be admitted at the discretion of the court. 7 Others bar absolutely
the affirmative use of test results from evidence.48 A few states, in-
cluding Pennsylvania, have enacted statutes that fall in neither of
the first two categories. The statutes in this third category explicitly
sanction the use of results showing non-paternity, but are silent as to
42. There is a limited amount of HLA frequency data available in many areas. Inter-
view, supra note 20. Unlike red cell tests, which have been conducted on a very wide scale for
many years, the HLA tests are realtively new and have generated much less data. Conse-
quently, a greater degree of extrapolation is involved in the estimation of HLA frequencies
than red cell frequencies. Id.
43. The results from a recent study performed by The Center for Demographic and
Population Genetics, University of Texas Health Science Center, Houston Texas in conjunc-
tion with the Division of Biological Sciences, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas were as
follows:
In conclusion, we emphasize that the currently used statistical methods for
positive identification of fathers are inefficient and very often lead to false attri-
butions of paternity. We therefore suggest that their use in courts be terminated
until better methods are devised. At the present time, the exclusion of paternity
seems to be the only conclusive evidence that can be used by courts of law.
Majumder and Masatoshi, A Note on Positive Identification of Paternity by Using Genetic
Markers, 33 HUMAN GENETICS 29, 34 (1983).
44. One expert asserts that there is inadequate quality control and that HLA testing is
not as standardized as the general public believes. Interview supra note 23. She also empha-
sizes that there is absolutely "no accredidation or licensing of HLA laboratories at the present
time." Another consideration is that only a few labs have the capability to perform such test-
ing. For instance, a 1979 survey conducted by the American Associates of Blood Banks re-
vealed that there were only 40 laboratories in the country that actually performed such tests
and that twenty-four states had absolutely no capability to perform these tests. Molthan, Red
Blood Cell Antigen Typings in Cases of Disputed Paternity 1 (1980) (unpublished manu-
script). See also Weiner and Socha, Methods Available for Solving Medicolegal Problems of
Disputed Parentage, 21 J. FOR. Sci. 42, 61 (1975) (detailing the problems with the HLA tests
including unreliable sera and inadequate laboratory capabilities).
45. Some writers have categorized the distinction between the use of blood test results
for inclusion and those for exclusion as "relative probabilities" versus "actual fact." See, e.g.,
Jaffee, Comment on the Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and Other Statistical
Evidence: Response to Terasaki, 17 J. FAM. L. 457, 458-68 (1978-79).
46. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have statutes addressing the admissi-
bility of blood tests in paternity suits. Note, A Survey of the Admissibility of Blood Test
Results in Paternity Actions in the Fifty States and the District of Columbia, 8 J. LEais. 301,
307 (1981).
47. Twenty-two states permit the admission of inclusion evidence. Id. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-307(a) (1980).
48. Seventeen states allow serological test results to be used only for exclusion evidence.
Note, supra, note 50 at 307. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66 G (1981).
confirmatory evidence.49 Of the three types of statutes, only those
that absolutely bar affirmative use have had much effect on the de-
velopment of case law in this area.5"
Except for a handful of recent decisions, 51 the contours of the
law concerning the inclusionary use of serological testing52 remain
essentially uncharted at the appellate level. Of the few appellate
court decisions that directly confront the issue, the most famous is
Cramer v. Morrison.53 In that case, the California Court of Appeals
found that the trial court erred in refusing to admit HLA results
which tended to confirm that the defendant was the father. The
Cramer court rejected the lower court's determination that statutory
law, 5' although silent as to inclusion, 5 precluded the affirmative use
of HLA results because the legislature had specifically declined to
adopt a provision that would have permitted the affirmative use of
blood tests.56 The Cramer court did not address the issue whether
the omission signaled a legislative intent to bar the inclusionary use
of blood tests in general. Instead, the court evaded this statutory de-
termination by finding that the statute governed only the traditional
"Landsteiner series ' 57 of blood tests.58 Furthermore, the court sug-
gested that, because the law predated the more sophisticated HLA
test, it could not have been intended to govern them.59 The Cramer
49. See, e.g., The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6131-6137 (Purdon 1982).
50. Most of the statutes that allow inclusion merely defer to the discretion of the courts.
Therefore, the case law development is not drastically affected by such a statute. See Note,
supra note 46 at 307. Statutes that bar the evidence naturally tend to stagnate case law. See,
e.g., J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 969, 285 N.W. 2d 880 (1979) (refusing to allow HLA results as
confirmatory purposes). But see Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (circum-
venting a statute by restrictive interpretation).
51. See supra note 11.
52. "Serologic test" is defined as "any test that detects antigens by using antisera (an-
tibodies) .. " Terasaki, supra note 18, at 545.
53. 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979).
54. The statute in question was CAL. EvID. CODE. § 895 (West 1966) (amended 1981).
55. The California statute has been amended since the Cramer case to allow blood test
results to be admitted for inclusionary purposes. See CAL. EvID. CODE. § 895 (West Supp.
1983) (amending CAL. EVID. CODE. § 895 [West 19661). That statute, in relevant part, now
provides: "[i]f the tests show the probability of the alleged father's paternity, the question...
shall be admitted upon all the evidence." Id. This language is significant because it appears to
be open to the interpretation that the courts do not have the discretion to bar admission in
individual cases.
56. See 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865.
57. The court characterized ABO, MNSs, and Rh tests as the "Landsteiner series" of
tests. Id. at 882, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 869 (1979). These tests are sometimes referred to as
"Landsteiner tests" because Karl Landsteiner was instrumental in the development of these
tests. Landsteiner was the first to discover the red cell systems. In 1900, he discovered the
ABO system. In 1927, together with Levin, he discovered the MN system. In 1941, with Wei-
ner, he detected the presence of the Rh system. Comment, The Use of Blood Tests in Actions
to Determine Paternity, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1980).
58. The court reasoned that the statute may preclude blood tests, but HLA tests could
be seen as the "tissue typing of white blood cells." 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 882, 153 Cal. Rptr.
865, 869 (1979).
59. The Court emphasized that in 1975, when the statute was adopted, HLA testing had
court also rejected the lower court's second justification for excluding
the proffered evidence: that this type of evidence would have an un-
due influence upon jurors. Addressing this contention, the court con-
cluded that these results were entitled to have a great influence be-
cause, unlike traditional evidence in paternity suits, 60 these statistics
constituted objective, scientific evidence. 1 The court proceeded to
point out, however, that the issue of whether the test had received
general acceptance in the scientific community would have to be re-
solved before the tests could be admitted. 62 The Cramer court de-
clined to adjudicate this issue, noting that being an issue of mixed
law and fact, it should be resolved at the trial level.6 3
Malvasi v. Malvasi,64 a New Jersey appellate court decision,
went even further than Cramer by finding HLA testing for confirma-
tory purposes reliable as a matter of law and, therefore, admissible
in paternity cases. The decision rested almost entirely upon a deter-
mination that "[t]he acceptance of HLA testing in the scientific
community as accurate is evinced in the joint AMA-ABA guidelines
for serologic testing in paternity cases wherein the HLA test was
recommended as the most powerful single paternity test for
exclusion."e8
Subsequently, a minority of jurisdictions have followed the
Cramer-Malvasi lead in deeming HLA test results admissible for in-
clusion. One of the earliest decisions to follow this line of reasoning
was Carlyon v. Weeks,66 where a Florida appellate court upheld a
lower court's admission of HLA results to establish paternity. Al-
though Florida had no statute concerning blood test results, the
not been in use for paternity testing in California. Id. at 884, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
60. The traditional evidence in paternity suits is often no more than accusations and
hearsay evidence. Many times traditional evidence even includes the comparison of the fea-
tures of the putative father with those of the child and the use of gossip. Comment, Proving
Paternity by Means of Serological Testing: Should it be Admitted as Evidence by the Courts,
1981 DET. C. L. REv. 47, 80.
61. 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 886, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 872. Contra Jaffee, supra note 45, at
484 (arguing that the admission of confirmatory results will be highly prejudicial to the ac-
cused because they are estimates and juries will not understand them).
62. 88 Cal. App. 3d at, 889, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 872. From an academic standpoint, this
final caveat has a significant limiting effect on the breadth of the holding. In refusing to hold
HLA tests for inclusion as reliable as a matter of law, the court did not foreclose the possibil-
ity of the results being found unreliable at the trial court level.
63. id.
64. 167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (1979).
65. Id. (emphasis added). The court's reasoning is flawed by its assimilation of the inclu-
sion and exclusion approaches. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. The failure to recog-
nize the distinction between HLA inclusion and exclusion evidence is common in legal analyses
concerning the admissibility issue. For example, one commentator ignored the distinction when
he suggested that statutes which only permit the use of test results for exclusion are a form of
gender-based discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because they only allow men to benefit from the test results. See
Comment, supra note 60 at 72-75.
66. 387 So. 2d 465 (Fla. App. 1980).
traditional rule in that state had been that blood tests could only be
used to establish non-paternity.67 The Weeks court concluded, how-
ever, that the rule was developed on the basis of the less accurate
traditional tests. 8 The court noted that according to the expert testi-
mony presented to the lower court, the accuracy of HLA testing,
when used with other tests, was over 90%.19 Unlike Malvasi, the
Weeks court did not unequivocally hold that HLA testing is a relia-
ble technique. The Weeks decision went no further than to find that
on the basis of the testimony presented to the court below, it was not
an abuse of discretion to permit the admission of such evidence.
A more recent example of the trend is Hennepin County Wel-
fare Board v. Ayers.70 In Ayers, the Minnesota Supreme Court, rely-
ing heavily upon the AMA-ABA Guidelines,1 found the positive use
of HLA tests to be reliable. The Minnesota court further noted that
the admission of confirmatory HLA results was consistent with a
new statute which allowed any party, including the mother to compel
the other parties, including the defendant, to submit to tests.2 The
court suggested that the mother's ability to require the defendant to
be tested would be meaningless if confirmatory results could not be
used. 8 The Ayers court cautioned, however, that confirmatory re-
sults were not conclusive, and the proper foundation must be laid
before the tests may be admitted. 4
67. Id. at 467.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 466.
70. 304 N.W. 2d 879 (Minn. 1981).
71. Maile, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell, and Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present
Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976).
These guidelines have been cited in every major decision dealing with the admissibility of
confirmatory HLA results. See, e.g., Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 888, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 865, 874 (1979). They have usually been interpreted by the courts as an unqualified
statement that HLA testing for inclusionary purposes is presently reliable and accepted. See,
e.g., Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279, 280 (1979) (finding that the
Guidelines article demonstrates that the affirmative use of HLA testing is reliable). A careful
reading of the article, however, reveals that it recommended the affirmative use of HLA test-
ing only after certain methods and safeguards could be developed to insure the accuracy of
results. One of the most important of these recommendations called for the development of a
reliable sera. Id. at 280-84. An expert and lecturer on paternity testing asserts that the sera
and other techniques used for HLA testing are far from standardized. She claims, "If you take
the samples to four or five different labs, you will get four or five different results." Interview,
supra note 23. The AMA-ABA recommendations also state, "Those laboratories which desire
to be 'accredited' for this purpose should be required to meet rigorous standards of perform-
ance." Maile, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell, and Krause, supra note 71 at 283 (emphasis added).
To date, no accreditation standard whatsoever has been established. Interview, supra note 23.
Only one major decision, Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), has even questioned
whether these requirements had ever materialized.
72. See MINN. STAT. § 257.62 (1980).
73. 304 N.W. 2d 879, 881-82 (Minn. 1981). It is interesting to note that this exact
argument was raised in the Turek case by the appellant, but was not addressed by the court.
See Brief for Appellant at 7, Turek v. Hardy, - Pa. Super. -. , 458 A.2d 562 (1983).
74. 304 N.W. 2d 879, 882 (Minn. 1981). The court was ambiguous concerning what
would be sufficient for a proper foundation. However, the strong dicta in the case regarding
A more conservative stance towards the HLA admissibility con-
troversy appeared in Phillips v. Jackson.75 In Phillips, the Utah Su-
preme Court held that the trial court had committed a prejudicial
error by allowing the positive use of HLA results without first re-
quiring a proper foundation concerning the reliability of the inclu-
sion procedure in general, in addition to a foundation relating to the
test conditions in the individual case.76 The Utah court concluded
that legal periodical articles were not a sufficient basis for the court
to hold, as a matter of law, that the tests were generally admissi-
ble.77 The court added that the proper standard which governs the
admissibility of any scientific evidence is whether the procedure is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.78 The Phil-
lips majority79 espoused an elaborate set of guidelines, which would
have to be followed before a foundation could be considered proper.80
The thrust of the foundation inquiry mandated by the guidelines was
aimed at the credibility of HLA testing for inclusion as a scientific
method. This aspect of the Phillips case, while not necessarily incon-
sistent with Cramer and Weeks, is the antithesis of the Malvasi
view, which essentially forecloses the trial court's inquiry into the
overall reliability of the inclusion method. The Phillips court did
note, however, that there were no statutory obstacles to the admis-
sion of HLA results.81
Only a few appellate courts that have adjudicated the issue of
HLA admissibility have refused to allow the tests to be admitted.
Most of these cases, however, such as J.B. v. A.F., 2 have done so on
statutory grounds without addressing the issue of reliability.
When the Turek case came before the Superior Court, no Penn-
sylvania appellate court had yet considered the HLA admissibility
matter, even though several trial courts across the Commonwealth
had routinely admitted confirmatory blood test results. 83
the reliability of HLA testing, indicates that the credibility of the inclusion method as an
overall technique would not be necessary for a proper foundation.
75. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
76. Id. See also Varney v. Young, 106 Mich. App. 545, __ N.W.2d - (1981)
(confirmatory blood tests are admissible once proper foundation made).
77. 615 P.2d 1228, 1236 (Utah 1980).
78. The standards articulated by the court were originally formulated in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 12013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
79. A dissenting opinion noted that " every new and useful acquisition of knowledge
must have its use for the first time; and that neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty in
such a test should prevent its results from being received and considered as evidence." 615
P.2d 1228, 1238 (Utah 1980) (dissenting opinion).
80. 615 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Utah 1980).
81. The court noted that even if statutory law precluded the use of blood tests for inclu-
sion, the HLA tests were not blood tests. Id. at 1233. See generally supra note 20.
82. 92 Wis. 2d 696, 285 N.W. 2d 880 (1979). Accord Simons v. Jorg, 375 So. 2d 288
(Fla. App. 1979) (holding that although there was no statutory bar to their use, the results
were inadmissible because the traditional rule forbade such use).
83. Brief for Appellant at 8, Turek v. Hardy, - Pa. Super. - , 458 A.2d 562
The Turek court began its analysis by emphasizing that a find-
ing of clear abuse of discretion is required before a trial court's deci-
sion to exclude a piece of evidence may be reversed on appeal. 4
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether HLA testing, when
considered on the aggregate level, is a reliable scientific technique.85
Although this determination was the most significant aspect of the
decision, the court summarily disposed of the issue. Relying solely
upon legal articles86 and a few precedents from other jurisdictions,
the court concluded that the credibility of HLA testing had been
established.8 In a footnote, the Turek majority cited a footnote from
Justice O'Connors concurring opinion in Mills v. Habluetzel,88 as
attesting to the reliability of HLA tests.89
Having found that HLA test results could reliably indicate the
likelihood of paternity, the Turek court evaluated the probative value
of such results to the determination of paternity.90 The court rea-
soned that a highly reliable scientific indication that the accused is
the father would certainly facilitate the resolution of the central is-
sue of paternity litigation. Noting the similarity of the California
test for relevancy91 to the Pennsylvania standard, 2 the court cited
Cramer" as a germane precedent for a finding of relevancy. 94
On the basis of the determination that HLA tests were both
reliable and relevant, the Turek majority rejected the lower court's
contention that statutory silence regarding the affirmative use of
blood tests evinced a legislative intent to bar such evidence.9" The
court emphasized that the statute had been enacted prior to the
(1983).
84. - Pa. Super. . , 4358 A.2d 562, 563 (1983).
85. Id. at 563-64.
86. The court reviewed the following articles: Maile, supra note 14; Terasaki, supra note
18; Comment, supra note 60; Comment, supra note 57..
87. - Pa. Super. - , 458 A.2d 562, 564 (1983).
88. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
89. - Pa. Super. - , 458 A.2d 562, 564 n.2 (1983). The footnote referred to by
the court discussed the probative value of HLA with respect to exclusion. See Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98 n.4 (1982) (O'Connor J., concurring with three Justices joining
the Concurring Opinion and Justice Powell joining all but the final paragraph).
90. - Pa. Super. - , 458 A.2d 562 (1982).
91. The California test concerning relevancy is whether the evidence tends logically to
prove or disprove a material issue. Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 880, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 865, 868 (1979). See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966) (evidence tending to
prove or disprove any disputed fact of consequence).
92. In Pennsylvania, evidence is considered relevant if it tends to establish the material
facts. Turek, - Pa. Super. -, 458 A.2d 562, 564 (1973). Accord Bowers v. Garfield,
382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (evidence is relevant if it advances the inquiry) aff'd 503
F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Leroi v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 34 Pa. Commw. 190
(1978)(evidence is relevant if it tends to establish facts.)
93. 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979).
94. __ Pa. Super. *, 458 A.2d 562 (1983). But cf Jaffee, supra note 45 at 458-
68 (arguing that even if HLA testing were accurate, it would only show that a class of men
may be the father, and therefore, it is irrelevant as to the individual defendant).
95. - Pa. Super. -, 458 A.2d 562, 565 (1983).
wide-spread use of HLA testing." Furthermore, the court asserted
that because HLA tests were more accurate than the traditional
tests, the "rejection of the affirmative use of blood test results by the
Legislature was not a rejection of the HLA test.""7
In order to underscore the persuasiveness of its reasoning, the
Turek court enumerated the public policy considerations which favor
the admission of confirmatory results.98 These concerns include en-
suring the rights of illegitimate children99 and relieving taxpayers of
the cost of support. 00
The court cautioned, however, that inclusionary HLA results
are not conclusive proof of paternity, but must be considered along
with other evidence. 101 The court acknowledged that although it
found the inclusionary use of HLA testing to be generally reliable,
there may be invalidating circumstances peculiar to an individual
case.10 2 In order to ferret out such peculiarities, the court held that a
proper foundation must be laid in each case concerning the particu-
lar testing situation. 03 Addressing this concern, the majority
promulgated a set of guidelines which would have to be followed for
a proper foundation to be established.10 4 Although the court noted
that the guidelines were not exhaustive, it plainly focused the foun-
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Cf. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 11 (1981) (discussing public policy concerns
that favor adequately safeguarding the rights of the putative father, and noting the "quasi-
criminal" overtones caused by public assistance pressure on mothers to bring paternity suits);
Corra v. Coil, 305 Pa. Super. 179, 451 A.2d 480 (1982) (holding that indigent defendants in a
civil paternity suit have a right ot be represented by court-appointed counsel).
99. The United States Supreme Court, in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), enun-
ciated the principle that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits a
state from discriminating against illegitimate children. Specifically applying this principle to
the area of paternity litigation, the Court later held that once a state bestows a right upon
children to receive support from their biological father, it is unconstitutional for that state to
deny the right to illegitimate children. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). This has been
construed to mean that statutes which provide unduly harsh periods of limitation for paternity
suits unconstitutionally discriminate against illegitimate children. See, e.g., Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (invalidating a one-year limitation in a Texas statute). See
generally H. KRAUSE, supra note 12, at 59-84 (thorough discussion regarding the development
of illegitimate children's rights).
100. - Pa. Super. - , 458 A.2d 562 (1983).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. Accord Carlyon v. Weeks 378 So. 2d 465 (Fla. App. 1980); Malvasi v. Malvasi,
167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279, 280 (1979). But see Cramer v. Morrison 88 Cal. App. 3d
873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979) (requiring foundation concerning the general reliability of
HLA testing as a technique); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (refusing to find
HLA testing reliable as a matter of law).
104. - Pa. Super. -, 458 A.2d 562, 565 (1983). The guidelines the court es-
poused include:
1. the effect of racial and ethnic variables.
2. any factors which might invalidate the test or its accuracy . ..
3. the procedure of the actual tests
4. the qualifications of the witnesses.
Id.
dation inquiry upon the test conditions of the individual case as op-
posed to HLA testing reliability in general.1"5
In concluding the Turek opinion, the majority stated that "our
holding that these tests are admissible is without prejudice to the
defendant's right to challenge the reliability of the results and test
methods in an individual case."' 106
In his concurring opinion, Justice Johnson agreed with the court
on all major issues, but believed that the majority should have either
established a comprehensive set of guidelines or none at all.10
7
The Turek decision has gone as far as any decision that has yet
to consider the admissibility question. The use of the "likelihood of
paternity" in court is a complex issue with serious ramifications for
defendants. The "likelihood of paternity" notion is dangerous be-
cause it is too easily viewed as the percentage of men excluded by
testing. The "likelihood of paternity" goes far beyond this, into the
realm of speculation-an area better left to the trier of fact. It is an
estimate based on an estimate, calculated by a controversial formula.
It was designed to quantify only one small aspect of the overall pa-
ternity issue: the comparison of the blood types of the parties. In
practice, however, it has become an end in itself. Ignoring the inade-
quacies of the method, there appears to be something inherently un-
fair about using a test result that is not directly related to whether
the man is actually the father. 08 The use of such an unreliable and
prejudicial piece of evidence raises serious moral considerations,
which were not adequately confronted in the Turek decision.
While there have only been a few major decisions to confront
the issue, clearly, the trend is in favor of the admissibility of confir-
matory test results. Therefore, it is imperative that procedural safe-
guards be developed regarding the use of this type of evidence.
105. Id. It is interesting to note that although the court derived the guidelines from
Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Utah 1980), it deleted all guidelines relating to
HLA reliability in general.
106. - Pa. Super. - , 458 A.2d 562, 565 (1983).
107. Id. at 566.
108. For a case which demonstrates the danger of placing too much emphasis on HLA
testing for inclusion, see O'Bannon v. Azar, 435 So.2d 1144 (La. App. 1983), cert. den., 104 S.
Ct. 1710 (1484). In O'Bannon, the appellate court upheld the dismissal of a paternity case
notwithstanding a test result of 99.1%, since the defendant established that he had a negative
sperm count, that he had undergone a vasectomy in the past, and that he was in another part
of the country during the time in question.
[Casenote by James A. Diamond.]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DuE PROCESS-PRISONERS FACING
INTERSTATE TRANSFER DO NO MERIT DUE PROCESS PROTEC-
TION ABSENT A STATE-CREATED LIBERTY INTEREST. Olim v.
Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
In Olim v. Wakinekona,1 a divided2 United States Supreme
Court held that the transfer of a prisoner from a state prison in Ha-
waii to a state prison in California did not deprive an inmate of any
liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment4 when Hawaii law allowed prison officials complete dis-
cretion to transfer inmates.6 While a similar ruling that prisoner
transfers do not implicate due process had been announced previ-
ously in Meachum v. Fano,B Olim significantly expands the scope of
Meachum to include interstate transfers of prisoners from institu-
tions governed by a procedurally specific state law.
Delbert Wakinekona was serving a life sentence in the maxi-
mum control unit of the Hawaii State Prison following his conviction
for murder and classification as a maximum security risk.7 He was
1. 103 S.Ct. 1741 (1983).
2. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan
and, in part, by Justice Stevens, dissented.
3. The Court's fifth and fourteenth amendment due process interpretations have yielded
a broad definition of what constitutes "liberty" and "property" interests deserving of proce-
dural protection against arbitrary deprivation. The Court has held "core" liberty interests to
include "not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to con-
tract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children [and] to worship God according to the dictates
of. . .conscience." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Accord Adams v. Janner,
244 U.S. 590 (1916); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1904). See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951) (declaring that the designation of certain groups as Communist invalid for restricting
liberty interest in reputation). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (an individual
whose name is placed on police crime sheets without a hearing has no liberty interest in his
reputation); Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 A, 169 (1944) (temporary confinement of per-
son alleged to be insane while final determination of insanity is pending is not an unwarranted
deprivation of liberty); State v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 S.W. 595 (Mo. 1899) (the right
to liberty does not give insurance companies the right to contract among themselves to main-
tain stipulated rates). For a discussion of the different kinds of rights which extend from the
due process clause, see Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
1048 (1968). See generally TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
4. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall. . .deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. See infra note 12.
6. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
7. 103 S. Ct. 1743 (1983).
also serving sentences for rape, robbery, and escape." On August 2,
1976, a committee established by Antone Olim, the prison adminis-
trator, 9 convened to investigate the breakdown of prisoner discipline
in the maximum control unit.10 After a series of hearings, at which
inmates testified, the committee cited Wakinekona and another in-
mate as the source of discipline problems." Three days later,
Wakinekona received notice that the committee would review his file
at a hearing in compliance with Hawaii State Prison regulations 2 to
determine whether he should be transferred to another prison either
in Hawaii or on the mainland. On August 10, the same committee
which had earlier singled out Wakinekona as a troublemaker, pre-
sided over his transfer hearing. The committee heard the prisoner's
oral testimony and his counsel's arguments,1 8 after which it recom-
mended that he be transferred, citing his "disruptive and violent be-
havior," his poor relationship with the prison staff," and the "im-
pending construction of a new facility."1 5 Administrator Olim
accepted the committee's recommendation and Wakinekona was
8. Id.
9. Under Rule IV, §2 of the Supplementary Rules and Regulations of the Corrections
Division, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii (approved June, 1976),
the prison administrator is required to establish "an impartial Program Committee composed
of at least three members who were not actively involved in the process by which the in-
mate. . .was brought before the Committee." Id. at 1744.
10. Id. at 1743.
11. id.
12. Paragraph 1 of Rule IV states,
An inmate's. . .classification determines where he is best situated within
the Corrections Division. Rather than being concerned with isolated aspects of
the individual or punishment (as is the adjustment process), classification is a
dynamic process which considers the individual, his history, his changing needs,
the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division, the other in-
mates. . ., the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors. It
never inflicts punishment; on the contrary, even the imposition of a stricter clas-
sification is intended to be in the best interests of the individual, the State, and
the community. In short, classification is a continuing evaluation of each individ-
ual to ensure that he is given the optimum placement within the Corrections
Division.
Id.
Paragraph 3 provides that "the Committee must give the inmate written notice of the
hearing, permit him, with certain state exceptions, to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
afford him an opportunity to be heard, and apprise him of the Committee's findings."
Paragraph 3(3) elaborates,
[The administrator] may, as the final decisionmaker:
(a) Affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation; or
(b) hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security, or welfare of
the staff, inmate. . ., other inmates .. , institution, or community and refer the matter back
to the Program Committee for further study and recommendation.
Rule V provides that if the hearing concerns a "potential interstate transfer" an inmate
may retain counsel. Id. at 1744.
13. Id. at 1743.
14. Id. The Committee noted the progress that Wakinekona had made in a vocational
training program and his desire to continue in the program.
15. Id.
transferred a few days later to Folsom State Prison in California."
Following his transfer, Wakinekona filed suit in federal district
court against Olim and the members of the committee"7 alleging
that he had been denied procedural due process, 18 and that the com-
mittee had violated a provision of the prison regulations.19 The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint, holding that Hawaii's regula-
tions governing prison transfers failed to create a liberty interest
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.20
In support of its holding, the district court quoted a segment of a
First Circuit Court of Appeals decision:21 "Freedom from transfer is
16. Folsom State was a maximum security prison. See infra note 53.
17. Wakinekona filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
18. A prodigious number of cases have described what process is due under a variety of
facts. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (commencement of divorce pro-
ceedings); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (publication of drunkards'
names); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment of wages).
At its inception in the Constitution, due process was entirely a procedural concept. But as
the Supreme Court "selectively incorporated" many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight
amendments into the fourteenth, due process assumed a substantive meaning. Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). See generally CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDER-
STANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 43 (1981).
Today, only in its strictest sense does due process mean those procedures which states
must afford its citizens before depriving them of life, liberty, or property. Under its broadest
interpretation, due process means the limitations placed on states when depriving its citizens of
life, liberty, or property. The state's objective in instituting the deprivation must be within its
authority and the means of attaining the objective must be both reasonable and plainly
adapted to its achievement. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See gener-
ally Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L. J. 89.
19. See supra note 12.
20. Wakinekona v. Olim, 459 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978). Due process analysis
typically begins with two questions: is a protected interest infringed upon, and if so, what
procedures does due process require in this instance? For courts to reach the second question,
the first must be answered affirmatively. At present, courts adopt one of two methods of analy-
sis in answering the initial inquiry: either impact or entitlement analysis.
Impact analysis focuses on the basic concepts of life, liberty, and property and the impor-
tance these values have to individuals in varying contexts. If state action against an individual
infringes on a core value, and that infringement results in a substantial loss to the individual,
then due process protections are warranted. Under an impact view, courts examine individuals'
reasonable expectations of what they can lawfully be denied by the state.
Entitlement analysis holds that expectations give rise to protected interests only when
grounded in state law. Absent specific provisions of law, due process protections are inapplica-
ble. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524-25 (1978). Entitlement analysis has
been further divided by some scholars into a broad and narrow view. The more expansive
approach permits entitlements to arise not only from explicit provisions in state law, as does
the narrow view, but also from "the concept of fundamental or unalienable rights and protec-
tions." T. Gooding, The Impact of Entitlement Analysis: Due Process in Correctional Admin-
istrative Hearings, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 151, 154 (1981). See Comment, Protecting Fundamen-
tal Rights in State Courts: Fitting a State Peg to a Federal Hole, 12 HARV. C. R.-C.L.L.
REV. 63 (1979).
21. Four Unnamed Inmates v. Hall, 550 F.2d 1291 (1st Cir. 1977). The court of appeals
not a 'liberty interest' since an inmate may be transferred at the
whim of the Commissioner. Because no liberty interest has been in-
fringed by the transfer, due process does not attach. ' '22 On appeal, a
divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed.23 In holding that Hawaii had created a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest, the court declined to follow the
First, Second, and Sixth Circuit courts, which had previously held
that detailed procedural requirements governing prison transfers do
not create a liberty interest. 24 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed 25  after granting certiorari to consider for the first time
whether an interstate transfer of a prisoner implicates a liberty inter-
est within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Prior to the mid-1940's, courts were unwilling to extend consti-
tutional rights to prisoners. 6 Originally, this reluctance stemmed
from the belief that prisoners, as abusers of the law, alienate them-
selves from the law's protection. In 1944, however, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals declared that "a prisoner retains all the rights of
an ordinary citizen except those taken from him by law."27 But an-
other source of judicial restraint remained. Looking to the separation
of powers doctrine, courts defined "prison administration" as an ex-
ecutive function, which precludes interference by the courts.28 De-
reversed the lower court's holding that pertinent prison regulations severly limited the discre-
tion of prison officials to order transfers.
22. Id. at 1292.
23. 664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1981).
24. The Ninth Circuit Court noted that although the Supreme Court had ruled earlier
that state laws regulating prison transfers do not create a liberty interest, the applicable state
law in Olim differed substantially from the statutes ruled on by the Court. The Olim regula-
tions required an elaborate procedural formula whenever prisoners were subjected to a poten-
tially grievous loss. The court further noted that other courts have held that procedural re-
quirements give rise to an expectation protected by due process. See Lokey v. Richardson, 600
F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1979); Lamb v. Hutto, 467 F.Supp. 562 (E.D. Va. 1979). But see Bills v.
Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980); Cafone v. Manson, 594 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1979);
Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1977).
25. 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
26. In 1871, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared the policy that was to
dictate the ability of prisoners to assert their constitutional rights for the next five decades:
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society
of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men have
some rights it is true, such as the law in its benignity accords to them, but not
the rights of freemen. They are the slaves of the state undergoing punishment
for heinous crimes committed against the laws of the land.
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
27. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F,2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944). Despite this holding, the "hands-
off" policy forwarded by Ruffin v. Commonwealth eroded slowly. Perhaps the most enduring
justification for judicial restraint was the distinction courts drew between prisoners' "rights"
and "privileges." The constitutional protections of fifth and fourteenth amendment due process
were said to attach to rights but not privileges. The Supreme Court discredited this distinction
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
28. See R. SINGER & W. STATSKY, RIGHTS OF THE IMPRISONED: CASES, MATERIALS &
DIRECTIONS 581 (1974).
spite this constraint on adjudicating daily matters of prison opera-
tion,29 courts began determining which constitutional rights apply to
prisoners 0 and under what circumstances.81
Not until the 1971 Term did the Supreme Court consider the
application of due process to prisoners' rights. In Haines v. Kerner2
the Court held that under the due process clause, prisoners could
challenge certain changes in the conditions of their confinement. 8  In
reversing the lower court, 4 the majority stressed that the prisoner
must be afforded an opportunity to prove his claim. Within the next
three years, the Court decided two cases dealing with due process in
prison administrative proceedings."8 In Morrissey v. Brewer,8e the
29. The strict "hands-off" policy afforded to prison administrators declined in the areas
of parole revocation hearings and parole release hearings ostensibly because these types of
hearings involve less the daily administration of prisoners and more the process by which pris-
oners gain their freedom. This doctrine retained vitality, however, in the context of prison
disciplinary hearings, presumably because prison officials require unfettered discretion to
maintain order and, as experts in their field, possess greater skill than the courts in dealing
with prisoners who will remain prisoners for some time. The separation of powers doctrine,
therefore, continued to be applied to prison disciplinary hearings. The distinction between pa-
role related hearings and disciplinary hearings has been criticized on the ground that the rights
of a prisoner to due process are contingent upon the seriousness of the penalty he faces, and
not upon the type of hearing in which he is involved. See L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 576 (1965); McCormack, The Purpose of Due Process: Fair Hear-
ing or Vehicle for Judicial Review?, 52 TENN. L. REV. 1257 (1974).
30. Specific emphasis was placed on prisoners' rights under the fourteenth amendment.
Most courts willingly recognized the applicability of due process and equal protection to pris-
oners, although few detailed procedural requirements. See Kritsky v. MeGinnes, 313 F. Supp.
1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (prisoner charged with a serious violation of prison rules must be af-
forded a hearing that is meaningful in time and place and that is reasonably decided). See also
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (practical problems of prison
life determine procedures to which prisoners are entitled). See generally Millemann, Prison
Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process - the Requirement of a Full Administra-
tive Hearing, 31 MD. L. REV. 27 (1971); Wick, Procedural Due Process in Prison Discipli-
nary Hearings: The Case for Specific Constitutional Requirements, 18 S.D.L. REV. 309
(1973).
31. Under the first, eighth, and fourteenth amendments, prisoners' constitutional rights
have been upheld in situations concerning racial discrimination, inmate assault, corporal pun-
ishment, and restraints on the freedoms of religion, speech, and expression. See Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228
(4th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F.
Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Holt v. Sarner, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
32. 404 U.S. 519 (1971).
33. Id.
34. For a discussion of lower courts' handling of prisoners' right of due process before
Haines, see Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57
VA. L. REv., 861-71 (1971).
35. Prison proceedings may be either punitive or administrative, depending upon the
purpose of the action. Punitive measures include loss of good time, withdrawal of privileges,
reprimands placed in prisoners' records, and punitive segregation such as solitary confinement.
Administrative proceedings comprise many actions. Two of the administrative processes that
have a significant effect on prisoners are classification, a process by which a prisoner is placed
in a certain rehabilitative program or confined to a particular section of the prison or prison
within the system, and administrative segregation, which is identical to punitive segregation
except in purpose: administrative segregation is used to protect the inmate from his fellow
prisoners or other prisoners from him. See AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL
OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 411-12 (3d Ed. 1966).
36. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Court held that due process is required when parole is revoked;87 and
in Cagon v. Scarpelli,3 8 the court extended Morrissey to encompass
probation revocation hearings. In both cases, the Court required
some type of due process protection. 9 To determine the specific pro-
cedures required in Morrissey and Gagon, the Court balanced the
prisoner's interest in conditional liberty with the state's interest in
rehabilitating its inmates and protecting its citizens.4"
Wolff v. McDonnell41 marked the first time that the Supreme
Court ruled on prisoners' due process in prison disciplinary hear-
ings.42 In holding that prisoners threatened with the loss of good
time43 because of alleged rule infractions merited the protection of
due process," the Court limited the discretion of prison officials in
handling charges of misconduct.45 The Court noted that the United
37. The Iowa statute governing parole in Morrissey provided that parolees could be re-
turned to prison at any time. Since this law gave prison officials complete discretion, inmates
could have no reasonable expectation that their parole was an interest protected from state
intervention by due process. Had the Court reached its decision by entitlement analysis, it
would have found that the prisoner had no entitlement in state law, and therefore, no liberty
interest. Through impact analysis, however, the Court reasoned that since revocation of parole
is a substantial loss to a prisoner, that prisoner has a reasonable expectation that his interest in
remaining paroled is protected by due process. 408 U.S. at 479.
38. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
39. The Morrissey Court required written notice, disclosure to the parolee of the evi-
dence against him, opportunity to be heard, opportunity to question witnesses, an unbiased
hearing body, and a written statement explaining and justifying the factfinder's final decision.
408 U.S. at 489. Gagnon required the same procedures as Morrissey and added the require-
ment of counsel when "fundamental fairness" so demanded. 411 U.S. at 790.
40. The Court in Morrissey and in Board of Regents v. Roth, decided the same day,
indicated that use of a balancing test was improper in determining the applicability of due
process: "to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look
not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake. . . . We must look to see if the
interest is within the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board of
Regents v.Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (emphasis in original).
Prior to these cases, courts determined both the applicability of due process and the exact
procedures required by balancing the interests involved. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969) (court balanced the deprivations imposed on an individual against the
state's interests in acting without the restraint of formal procedures). Accord Bill v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 420 F.2d
1243 (1st Cir. 1970).
Morrissey and Roth, therefore, replace the balancing test with a linguistic approach: An
interest is protected by due process if it comports with what the court has determined to be
fourteenth amendment liberty and property. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
41. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
42. Wolff concerned a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in the revocation of good
time credits. Similar to the revocation of parole, loss of good time postpones the prisoner's re-
entry into society. The interests at stake, therefore, are the same. See Comment, Two Views of
a Prisoner's Right to Due Process. Meachum v. Fano, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 405, 423
(1980).
43. Good time are credits which accumulate based on a prisoner's good behavior and
then are deducted from his sentence. In contrast, a prisoner who violates the prison's rules may
lose the good time he has accrued, or lose his right to earn time entirely. See Jacob, Prison
Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 231 nn. 17 & 18 (1970).
44. 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
45. The Nebraska statute dealing with revocation of privileges in Wolff provided that
"[e]xcept in flagrant or serious cases, punishment for misconduct shall consist of deprivation of
States Constitution contains no clause establishing due process pro-
tections for prisoners' good time credits,4" but that the state had
given substance to its prisoners' expectation of retaining the credits
by "providing a statutory right to good time credit and specifying
that it was to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior. '47  In con-
cluding that state law created a liberty interest, 4 the Court also de-
cided the question of what procedures are required to protect the
interest." The majority stressed, however, that the prescribed proce-
dures only applied to prison disciplinary hearings involving loss of
good time credits or possibly solitary confinement.10
Two years after Wolff, inmates at the Massachusetts Correc-
tional Institution argued that their intrastate transfer to a prison
where conditions were "substantially less favorable"' had a signifi-
cantly adverse effect upon them and thus, implicated due process.52
In Meachum v. Fano, prisoners incarcerated in a medium security
prison were transferred to a maximum security facility's within
privileges." The single procedural inclusion required that the committee reviewing the incident
inform the prisoner of the charges against him. Id. at 548.
46. Id. at 556.
47. Id. at 557. The Court explained,
But the state having created the right to good time and itself recognizing
that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner's
interest has a real substance and is sufficiently embraced within fourteenth
amendment "liberty" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate
under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that
the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.
Id.
48. By specifically basing its holding on a statutory entitlement, the Wolff Court aban-
doned the impact method of analysis used in Morrissey. Some explanations for this shift in
method have been posited, perhaps the most likely of which is that entitlement analysis is, on
its face, more determinitive and autonomous than the impact approach. See generally R.
DWORKIN, Is Law a System of Rules?, in EssAYs IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25 (Summers ed.
1970).
49. Once courts reach the question of which procedures are due, they employ a balanc-
ing test with three factors predominating in the calculation: first, the severity of loss an indi-
vidual suffers when the government deprives him of a protected interest; second, the govern-
ment's interest in swift adjudication, and third, the utility of the requested procedures in
solving the problem at issue. State interests typically take two forms: reducing administrative
burdens and protecting the state's substantive objectives. In addressing the latter interest,
courts will ask if the type of procedures requested would seriously interfere with the state's
realization of its objective. In weighing the former interest, courts will simply ask if the imple-
mentation of the requested procedures will result in an unmanageable administrative burden.
See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of
Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1516-1518 (1975).
50. In formulating specific procedures required when a prisoner is threatened with the
loss of good time, the Wolff Court balanced the inmate's interest in retaining his credits and
avoiding arbitrary punishment against the state's interests in maintaining administrative flex-
ibility, reducing confrontations between staff and inmates, and insuring security and discipline
within the prison. Once these interests were balanced, the court outlined the procedures it felt
would afford the prisoner minimum due process protections. 418 U.S. at 564-660.
51. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
52. Id. at 222.
53. Transfers from medium to maximum security prisons may involve an increased
hardship to a prisoner on two counts: first the degree of control exercised over the inmate
increases; second, the transfer typically postpones the inmate's parole release date. See gener-
Massachusetts, following their alleged involvement in a series of fires
at the prison. 4 Unlike the statute in Wolff, Massachusetts law did
not require specific acts of prisoner misconduct before authorizing a
transfer.8 5 The inmates were given notice of the charges against
them and given an opportunity to testify in front of the classification
board, although neither of these procedures was required by state
law." The prisoners were not, however, permitted to hear the evi-
dence against them." On the board's recommendation, the Director
of Classification approved the transfers. Consequently, the prisoners
charged that their constitutional rights had been violated because
transfers to prisons where the conditions are substantially less
favorable, result in a significant loss's and thus, require due process.
Because Meachum concerned a state law that did not condition dis-
ciplinary proceedings on specific acts of misconduct, the predicate
for imposing the due process in Wolff never arose. Thus, in
Meachum, the Court was afforded the opportunity to extend the ap-
plication of the Wolff due process requirements to intrastate prison
transfers. While reaffirming that "an inmate retains a variety of im-
portant rights the courts must be alert to protect," 9 the Meachum
majority rejected the inmates' argument that a substantial loss trig-
gers due process. The Court further noted that although a prisoner
whose behavior conforms to prison regulations may expect to remain
at one institution," the expectation, by itself, fails to implicate due
process" when state law imposes no restraints on the discretion of
prison authorities. 62 The Court explained; "[T]he Due Process
ally Jacob and Sharma, Disciplinary and Punitive Transfer Decisional and Due Process Val-
ues in the American Correctional System, 12 STETsoN L. REV. 2, 68 (1982).
54. 427 U.S. at 217.
55. The relevant Massachusetts law provides: The commissioner may transfer any sen-
tenced prisoner from one correctional institution of the commonwealth to another, and with
the approval of the sheriff of the county from any such institution. . .to any jail or house of
correction. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 127, § 97 (West 1974).
56. 427 U.S. at 226 n.7,
57. Id. at 220.
58. See supra note 53.
59. 427 U.S. at 225.
60. See infra note 76.
61. The Meachum Court observed that in Wolff, prisoners could be transferred only
after "serious misconduct." Since transfers at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution were
not so conditioned, the prisoners' expectations were "too ephemeral and insubstantial" for pro-
cedural due process to attach. Id. at 228.
62. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. The dissent's
strongest criticism was aimed at the majority's use of entitlement analysis:
The Court's holding today. . .appears to rest on a conception of "liberty"
which I consider fundamentally incorrect. . . . According to the court, a liberty
interest may "originate in the Constitution. . .or it may have its roots in state
law. . . . If a man were a creature of the state, the analysis would be cor-
rect. . . . I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their crea-
tor with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom
which the Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privi-
leges conferred by specific laws or regulations.
Clause does not impose a nationwide rule mandating transfer hear-
ings."68 Consequently, the Court upheld the transfers as requiring no
procedural due process protection.6'
In 1983, the Supreme Court again ruled on due process in the
context of prison disciplinary hearings. In Hewitt v. Helms," an in-
mate was confined in administrative custody following riots at the
State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania." The
prisoner contended that both the due process clause and Pennsylva-
nia regulations governing the administration of state prisons created
a liberty interest in being confined with the general population,
rather than segregated in an isolation cell. 7 In holding that threat of
substantial loss fails to implicate due process, 8 the Hewitt majority
reaffirmed Wolff. In determining whether the state law created a lib-
erty interest, the Court stated; "[W]e are persuaded that the re-
peated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with re-
quiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion that the
state has created a protected liberty interest." 69 Therefore, the Court
held in part,7 that the inmates had a liberty interest in remaining in
the general prison population, which merited the protection of due
process.
The Olim Court was confronted with a regulation similar to the
Id. at 231.
63. Id. at 229.
64. On the same day that Meachum was decided, the Court held in Montanye v.
Haymes, 427 U.S. 239 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) that the intrastate transfer of a pris-
oner in New York did not implicate due process. The Court ruled that under New York law,
the inmate "had no right to remain at any particular prison facility and no justifiable expecta-
tion that he would not be transferred unless found guilty of a misconduct." Id. at 243.
65. 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983).
66. Id. at 866.
67. Id. at 871.
68. Id. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stressed policy considerations in the
opinion. Should substantial loss always trigger due process, Rehnquist reasoned, then courts
would assume the role traditionally left to the discretion of prison officials.
69. Id. at 871. Section 95 of Title 37 of the Pennsylvania Code provides in part,
An inmate who has allegedly committed a Class I Misconduct may be
placed in Close or Maximum Administrative Custody upon approval of the office
in charge of the institution, not routinely but based upon his assessment of the
situation and the need for control pending application of procedures under §
95.103 (providing that an inmate may be temporarily confined when it has been
determined that there is a threat of disruption).
37 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 95.104(b)(1) (Shepard's 1979).
70. After holding that a liberty interest was created by Pennsylvania law, the Hewitt
Court examined the procedures required under Title 37, § 95 and determined that they af-
forded adequate due process protection. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, commented,
I agree that the regulations are relevant: by limiting the substantive rea-
sons for a transfer to administrative segregation and by establishing prescribed
procedures, these regulations indicate that the state recognizes the substantiality
of the deprivation. They therefore provide evidentiary support for the conclusion
that the transfer affects a constitutionally-protected interest in liberty. But the
regulations do not create that interest.
103 S. Ct. 864, 880 (1983) (emphasis in original).
statute in Hewitt.71 Both contained "language of an unmistakably
mandatory character", and both required specific procedures. The
Court distinguished Hewitt, however, by explaining that unlike the
law in Olim, state law in Pennsylvania limited the discretion of
prison authorities. The majority then applied the principles an-
nounced in Meachum. While admitting that the interstate transfer
of a prisoner differs from intrastate transfers involving short dis-
tances, the Olim majority found Meachum controlling for three
reasons.
First, the Court ruled that the difference between intra- and in-
terstate transfers is a difference of degree and not kind.73 Therefore,
the Court dismissed arguments that transfers out of state impose
greater hardships on prisoners than intrastate transfers. Both include
the hardships of separation from home, friends, and family, interrup-
tion or curtailment of rehabilitative programs, adjustment to a new
and potentially hostile environment, and greater difficulty in ob-
taining legal. counsel.74
Second, the Court analogized to its holding in Meachum, and
concluded that just as inmates have no justifiable expectation to re-
main in a particular prison, they have no justifiable expectation to
remain in a specific state.75 The Court reasoned that the rigors of
prison administration result in prisoners being transferred for a vari-
ety of reasons, 7' and noted that federal and state statutes and multis-
tate corrections agreements specifically provide for interstate trans-
fers. Thus, the power of the state to effect transfers, coupled with a
prisoner's limited constitutional rights after conviction, extinguish
any justifiable expectation a prisoner might have in remaining incar-
cerated in the same state. Consequently, even though interstate
transfers may impose hardships, such transfers are "within the nor-
mal limits. . .of custody. 7M The Court distinguished Vitek v.
Jones,'79 a case relied upon by Wakinekona, reasoning that transfer
71. See supra notes 12 and 43.
72. 103 S. Ct. at 871.
73. 103 S. Ct. at 1747.
74. These arguments had been forwarded in respondent's brief in Montanye v. Haymes,
427 U.S. 239 (1976) and had similarly been rejected. See supra note 64.
75. 103 S. Ct. at 1745.
76. The majority stated that "often, confinement in the inmate's home state will not be
possible," and cited factors such as overcrowding, the need to separate certain prisoners, and
inadequate facilities. Id. at 1746.
77. The court's study of the number of statutes authorizing interstate transfers and the
considerations necessitating frequent transfers implies that the majority took a broad rather
than a narrow focus under the entitlement approach. By considering custom, the court ex-
panded its Meachum analysis in which it did not look beyond state law. See supra note 20.
78. 427 U.S. at 225.
79. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). Vitek concerned the transfer of an inmate from prison to a
mental institution. The Court held that the transfer warranted due process protections because
state law created an entitlement and because the prisoner would suffer severe deprivation. The
to a mental institution results in treatment qualitatively different
than that which a prisoner may expect from incarceration.8" In con-
trast, transfer to a prison in another state is well within a prisoner's
expectations."s
Third, the Olim majority found that the Hawaii State Prison
regulations did not create a liberty interest because transfers were
not conditioned on specific acts of prisoner misconduct and prison
officials were given unlimited discretion.82 The Court explained that
the Hawaii prison regulation requirement of a particular type of
hearing failed to signify that lawmakers recognized a need for due
process protections. 8 Thus, the Court concluded that interstate
transfers were within the power of the state and the reasonable ex-
pectations of the prisoner, that a threat of any substantial depriva-
tion is irrelevant to due process, and that absent substantive limita-
tions on officials' discretion, interstate transfers do not implicate due
process protections.
In examining the Hawaii prison regulations, the Court noted
that the prison administrator was the only official decisionmaker
enumerated in the statute and, therefore, the Court need not con-
sider the substantive limitations placed on the program committee by
state law. 4 Finally, the majority added support to its conclusion that
the Hawaii prison regulation created no liberty interest entitled to
due process protections by noting that the Hawaii Supreme Court
had reached the same conclusion as the Olim majority two years
before, when it construed the same regulation. 5
The dissent in Olim argued that the appropriate inquiry in de-
termining the existence of a liberty interest is not whether state law
grants an entitlement, but whether the change in the conditions of
the prisoner's confinement results in a "grievous loss." s Justice Mar-
shall, writing for the dissenters, asserted that because a prisoner re-
Court had previously held that threat of great loss had no bearing on due process in the con-
text of parole revocation. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See supra note 48.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 1745.
81. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 12.
83. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
84. 103 S. Ct. at 1748. Far more extensive limitations were placed on the program com-
mittee than on the prison administrator. The committee was required to balance the interests
of the inmate, the state, and the community in deciding the prisoner's optimum placement.
The dissent commented that because Hawaii law provides for review of the committee's rec-
ommendations by the prison official, the decisionmaker's discretion is limited vicariously.
85. The Court referred to Lono v. Ariyoska, 63 Haw. 138, 621 P.2d 976 (1981), in
which the Hawaii Supreme Court held that Hawaii law "did not clothe plaintiff with the
requisite liberty interest." Id. at 981. The Court in Lono, relying on Meachum, adopted a
narrow entitlement approach. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
86. The dissent's analysis, which focused on custom, principles of fairness, and harm to
the prisoner, comports with the broad entitlement view used by the Vitek majority. See supra
notes 24 and 79.
tains a "significant residuum" '87 of protected interests, he is not lim-
ited to only those liberty interests that state law chooses to bestow.
Rather, the existence of a liberty interest may be deduced by com-
paring the treatment of an individual prisoner with the treatment of
the prison population as a whole. In Olim, such a comparison would
mandate a finding that an interstate transfer from Hawaii to Cali-
fornia is qualitatively different than the treatment of other prisoners.
The dissenters likened the transfer to banishment: "Wakinekona has
in effect been banished from his home; .. .For. . .possibly the rest
of his life, nearly 4,000 miles of ocean will separate him from his
family and friends." 88 Therefore, the dissent asserted, the interstate
transfer imposed hardships far in excess of those which generally
characterize imprisonment. 89 The dissent further argued that the
majority's assumption that transfers are both necessary and common
to prison administration was statistically unfounded 90 and, therefore,
interstate transfers are not within the standard conditions of confine-
ment. In reaching this conclusion, the dissenters necessarily found
Meachum not controlling. Because the language in Meachum
strictly referred to intrastate transfers, the dissent reasoned that the
Court's holding in that case did not compel the same conclusion in
an interstate transfer case. Justice Stevens joined the dissent in these
contentions. Finally, the dissenters urged that Olim involved a stat-
ute identical in every relevant way to the statute construed in Hew-
itt,91 and that the close correlation between the two laws dictated
similar interpretations: a liberty interest was created by both Penn-
sylvania and Hawaii law.9"
In Olim, the Supreme Court held that absent a statutory enti-
tlement, a prisoner has no liberty interest in remaining in the same
state and thus, no right to procedural due process protections. The
Olim holdings stands for the proposition that states may deny prison-
ers due process protection simply by taking away all inmate liberty
interests found in statutes, constitutions, and state common law.93 In
87. 103 S. Ct. at 1748.
88. Id. at 1749.
89. The Meachum Court stated that 'transfer from one institution to another within the
state prison system" fails to implicate due process and "[clonfinement in any of the state's
institutions is within the normal range of custody." 427 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added).
90. Citing a study by the Justice Department, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
PROFILE OF STATE PRISON INMATES: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC FINDINGS FROM THE 1974 SURVEY
OF INMATES OF STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 1 (1979), the dissent noted that the great
majority of state prisoners are incarcerated in facilities located within 250 miles of their
homes. 103 S. Ct. at 1750 n. 4.
91. Id. at 1751.
92. After asserting that liberty interests arise independent of state law, the dissent ar-
gued in the alternative, stating that even if entitlement analysis was valid, the majority misap-
plied the principles of entitlement to the facts in Olim. Id. at 1750-51.
93. See supra notes 20, 45-47 and accompanying text.
light of the Court's willingness to construe a liberty interest in Hew-
itt,O4 the Olim Court's reluctance to find an entitlement under a sim-
ilar statute undermines the Court's assertion that prisoners retain a
variety of important rights that courts must be alert to protect,95 and
forebodes a return to the outmoded belief that prisoners are slaves of
the state.96 Moreover, by conditioning due process protections on the
existence of an entitlement under state law, the Olim Court contra-
venes the fourteenth amendment's mandate against the state's abro-
gation of life, liberty, or property without due process. For, in sanc-
tioning states to create liberty interests protected by due process, the
Court also sanctions states to deny such procedural protections by
limiting entitlements. Furthermore, the inconsistencies between the
Hewitt and Olim decisions contradict the supposed definitiveness
achieved when courts look to state law to determine the need for due
process rather than to fundamental concepts of liberty. Thus, Olim
not only signifies a regression in judicial recognition of prisoners' due
process rights, but also exposes the weakness in conditioning liberty
interests on state entitlements.
94. See supra notes 67 and 68 and accompanying text.
95. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
96. See supra note 26.
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